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INTRODUCTION 
The United States wears its sovereignty most uneasily at 
home.  Abroad, U.S. sovereignty justifies a number of well-
settled practices, including national self-determination, 
border control, and sovereign immunity in foreign courts. But 
domestic sovereignty can be tricky.  In the United States, the 
people are the sovereign.1  Yet the U.S. government regularly 
invokes sovereign privileges against its people.2
The doctrine of sovereign immunity has met considerable 
public disfavor.  One group of citizens recently harmed by the 
doctrine erected a plaque to memorialize their discontent.  In 
the wake of the Hurricane Katrina litigation, a historical 
marker was added to the site of the 17th Street Canal Breach, 
reading in part: “In 2008, the US District Court, Eastern 
District of Louisiana placed responsibility for this floodwall’s 
collapse squarely on the US Army Corps of Engineers; 
however, the agency is protected from financial liability in the 
  One such 
privilege is the right to avoid suit. Unless it deigns otherwise, 
the federal government cannot be sued—even by citizens 
seeking redress for government-inflicted harms—a privilege 
belonging so clearly to the sovereign that it is labeled 
“sovereign immunity.” 
 
 1. See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 
1425, 1439 (1987) (“[T]he sovereignty of the people . . . informs every article of 
the Federalist Constitution” and that it is “no happenstance that the Federalists 
chose to introduce their work with words that ringingly proclaimed the primacy 
of that new understanding: ‘We the people of the United States . . . do ordain 
and establish this Constitution for the United States of America’ ”  (quoting U.S. 
CONST. pmbl.)); Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. 
REV. 1201, 1214 (2001) (citing approvingly to Amar’s argument that “the first 
words of the Constitution, ‘We the People,’ . . . makes the people sovereign” 
(quoting U.S. CONST. pmbl.)).  Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United 
States stated: 
To the Constitution of the United States the term SOVEREIGN, is 
totally unknown. There is but one place where it could have been used 
with propriety. But, even in that place it would not, perhaps, have 
comported with the delicacy of those, who ordained and established 
that Constitution. They might have announced themselves 
‘SOVEREIGN’ people of the United States: But serenely conscious of 
the fact, they avoided the ostentatious declaration. 
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 454 (1793) (Wilson, J.). 
 2. Acting as a sovereign, the national government exclusively determines 
who is a citizen and who is not.  See Chirac v. Chirac’s Lessee, 15 U.S. (1 
Wheat.) 259, 269 (1817) (“That the power of naturalization is exclusively in 
congress does not seem to be, and certainly ought not to be, controverted.”).  
Moreover, it can conscript us via the draft.  See 32 C.F.R. § 1615.1 (2014). 
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Flood Control Act of 1928” (a statute reaffirming the defense 
of sovereign immunity for certain flood-related claims).3  This 
public dissatisfaction echoes the widespread academic 
critiques of the doctrine, which focus almost exclusively on 
the dissonance between basic constitutional values—
democracy, justice, government redressability—and the 
virtually impenetrable citadel of sovereign immunity.4  As 
Professor John Copeland Nagle relayed, “No scholar, so far as 
can be ascertained, has had a good word for sovereign 
immunity for many years5 . . . . [N]early every commentator 
who considers the subject vigorously asserts that the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity must go.”6
Despite the academic encouragement to abandon the 
doctrine, the Supreme Court of the United States continues to 
reaffirm federal sovereign immunity.
 
7  As Justice Stevens 
wrote (apparently with some sadness), “the doctrine is 
unquestionably alive and well today.”8
 
 3. 33 U.S.C. § 702c (2013) (reaffirming the defense of sovereign immunity 
for certain flood-related claims).  The plaque was posted by Levees.org, an 
organization created in response to the Hurricane Katrina levee failures.  It was 
unveiled on August 23, 2010.  See Historic Plaque Program, LEEVES.ORG, 
http://levees.org/historic-plaque-program (last visited Sept. 23, 2013).  
 
 4. See, e.g., Steven Menashi, Article III as a Constitutional Compromise: 
Modern Textualism and State Sovereign Immunity, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1135, 1138 (2009) (“[T]he American doctrine of sovereign immunity is 
indefensible upon both theoretical and pragmatic grounds. . . .” (quoting CLYDE 
JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 160 (1972))); 
Gregory C. Sisk, The Continuing Drift of Federal Sovereign Immunity 
Jurisprudence, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 517, 525 (2008) (“From the founding of 
our nation, the mantle of sovereign immunity has rested uneasily on a 
government designed to be limited in powers and understood to draw its 
authority from the people.” (quoting United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 208–09 
(1882))); Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 1201 (“[S]overeign immunity is an 
anachronistic concept, derived from long-discredited royal prerogatives, and . . . 
it is inconsistent with basic principles of the American legal system.”). 
 5. John Copeland Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an Age of Clear 
Statement Rules, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 771, 775 n.24 (1995) (quoting Roger C. 
Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: The Need for of 
Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68 
MICH. L. REV. 389, 392 (1970)). 
 6. Id. (quoting KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 
25.01, at 435–36 (1958)). 
 7. See, e.g., United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287 (2009); Fed. 
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994); United States v. Mitchell, 445 
U.S. 535 (1980); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). 
 8. John Paul Stevens, Is Justice Irrelevant?, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1121, 1126 
(1993).  Stevens argues that sovereign immunity is a “judge-made doctrine” 
with “tentacles” that  
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This Article argues what none have before—that while 
the Court is right that federal sovereign immunity is not 
inherently unconstitutional, it is wrong that sovereign 
immunity is constitutional in its current form.  The argument 
is as follows: the doctrine of federal sovereign immunity is 
constitutional inasmuch as it is a background principle upon 
which the Constitution was drafted and insofar as it is 
consonant with the Constitution.  In articulating the doctrine, 
the Court has erred by ascribing to Congress the exclusive 
right to waive immunity.  If Congress truly had this exclusive 
waiver authority, it could decide to disallow any suit against 
the government, including those for constitutional violations.  
This is impermissible.  The Constitution requires that the 
Supreme Court serve as a check on the other two branches’ 
general compliance with constitutional values.9
This simple argument reveals that the waiver authority, 
properly construed, is constitutionally entrusted to not one, 
but at least two of the federal branches.  That two branches 
can share the waiver authority raises another possibility: the 
waiver authority can be shared by all three branches.  
  Accordingly, 
it does not allow the Court to give Congress the power to 
prevent the Court from hearing constitutional cases; to do so 
would negate the Court’s ability to monitor the 
constitutionality of Congress’s behavior.  Therefore, Congress 
cannot have exclusive control over sovereign immunity 
waiver.  This authority must be shared by Congress and the 
Court. 
This three-branch waiver configuration is based on the 
principle that each federal branch—legislative, executive, and 
judicial—can exercise only the powers and act only in the 
roles assigned to it by the sovereign people via the 
Constitution.  Because of the derivative and limited nature of 
 
deposit their seeds of injustice not only in the numerous recreational 
facilities that are a by-product of our flood control legislation, in the 
waters that are polluted by illegally-operated federal facilities, and in 
the rising tide of bankruptcy proceedings in all parts of the country, but 
also, no doubt, in numerous areas of litigation that have not yet 
completely surfaced. 
Id. at 1128.  Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States found in favor of 
the United States on sovereign immunity grounds as recently as 2012, when it 
held in United States v. Bormes, that sovereign immunity prevented the kind of 
suit the plaintiff had brought against the United States.  Id. at 19–20 
(discussing 133 S. Ct. 12 (2012). 
 9. See infra Part II.A. 
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the federal government’s sovereignty, the federal government 
is perhaps best viewed as holding proxy sovereignty.  That 
proxy authority is divided among the branches; no one branch 
wields all of the proxy powers.  As Congress and the Court 
each exercise one portion of the sovereign powers held by the 
federal government in proxy for the sovereign people, the 
President too acts as a partial proxy sovereign.  It follows, 
then, that as Congress and the Court can waive immunity in 
certain circumstances, the President also has a proxy 
sovereign right to waive immunity. 
The Court should adopt a three-dimensional form of 
immunity that recognizes each branch’s limited proxy 
sovereign right to waive immunity.  Doing so will accord the 
sovereign immunity doctrine with constitutional compliance.  
And it may ameliorate the most criticized feature of sovereign 
immunity—that it is a government defense virtually 
impenetrable by the people. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I explores the 
central feature of the current sovereign immunity waiver 
doctrine—exclusive congressional waiver—traces the history 
of the doctrine, discusses how it is used today, and presents 
its scholarly defenses.  Part II argues that exclusive 
congressional waiver is unconstitutional and explains that 
the Court must reconfigure the immunity doctrine to allow 
the Court to perform its necessary check on the political 
branches’ general constitutional compliance.  Part II 
concludes that immunity waiver power must be shared by at 
least Congress and the Court.  Part III advances the shared 
waiver power idea to its next logical step—one that reflects 
our three-branch government—by advocating an 
interpretation of sovereignty and the Constitution that would 
grant each branch its own (limited) power to waive immunity.  
The Article concludes by discussing the advantages of an 
immunity-waiver authority shared among the federal 
branches. 
I. ONE-DIMENSIONAL IMMUNITY: EXCLUSIVE CONGRESSIONAL 
WAIVER 
The current federal sovereign immunity doctrine centers 
on Congress’s exclusive right of waiver.  Yet exclusive 
congressional waiver is a feature of the current sovereign 
immunity doctrine with dubious origins and few scholarly 
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defenses.  Inspecting the shaky legs upon which exclusive 
congressional waiver wobbles is a first step to understanding 
why the doctrine is not a necessary feature of sovereign 
immunity—why, in fact, it is an unconstitutional one. 
A. The Origins of Exclusive Congressional Waiver 
Most origin stories of federal sovereign immunity are as 
follows: federal sovereign immunity is a long-standing legal 
principle, adopted by U.S. courts from early British 
jurisprudence, and affirmed by Congress, beginning first with 
its circa 1855 establishment of the United States Claims 
Court, which provided a judicial forum for contract claims 
against the government, and later with a host of statutory 
waivers of federal immunity.10  In this regime, only Congress, 
and only via legislation, has authority to allow suit against 
the federal government.  Exclusive congressional waiver is 
the linchpin of federal sovereign immunity waiver, 
consistently reinforced by Supreme Court jurisprudence and 
executive deference.  As commonly understood, sovereign 
immunity waiver is exclusively a congressional matter.11
But a closer look at history reveals that the most 
important actor in the story of federal sovereign immunity 




 10. See, e.g., ARTHUR MILLER ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
3654 (3d ed. 1998) (“The doctrine of sovereign immunity can be traced to the 
English concept that the king or queen, as the ultimate source of authority, 
could do no wrong and should not be disturbed in the exercise of his or her 
sovereign powers.”). 
 nor Congress—it is the 
United States Supreme Court.  The following discussion 
differs from previous accounts of the origins of federal 
 11. See, e.g., GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 800 (5th ed. 
2009) (“[Y]ou cannot sue the United States, for any reason or any form of relief, 
unless Congress has expressly consented by statute to be sued.”); GREGORY C. 
SISK, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 88 (4th ed. 2006) (“[T]he 
doctrine of federal sovereign immunity stands as a bar to the lawsuit unless and 
until Congress chooses to lift that bar and then only to the extent or degree that 
Congress chooses to do so.”). 
 12. Others have described the ways in which our previous thoughts about 
British sovereign immunity practice were based on misreadings of British legal 
history. Many have persuasively argued that British sovereign immunity did 
not prevent suit against the king. At least not in the ways traditionally thought. 
See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: 
Toward a First Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the 
Government, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 899, 923 (1997); Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against 
Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209, 210 (1963). 
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sovereign immunity by detailing the Court’s role in the 
development of federal sovereign immunity and emphasizing 
the Court’s unilateral decision to vest the waiver authority 
exclusively in Congress. 
Very early in its jurisprudence, the Court was unsure 
about how sovereign immunity would apply, if at all, to the 
United States’ unique federal system.  When the Court heard 
Chisholm v. Georgia just a few years after Ratification, the 
Court was asked to address the question of whether sovereign 
immunity prevented the plaintiff, Mr. Chisholm, from suing 
the state of Georgia.13  The Court decided that, in the new 
American nation, sovereign immunity was not a defense 
behind which states could hide.14  Dissatisfied with the 
Court’s decision, the states quickly worked to adopt a 
constitutional amendment that would codify the protection of 
states from private suits.15
What is often overlooked in Chisholm is the Court’s 
earliest discussion of federal sovereign immunity.  Although 
the Chisholm decision turned entirely on state sovereign 
immunity, two of the five justices mentioned the idea of 
federal sovereign immunity in seriatim opinions and both 
expressed disfavor with the doctrine as a matter of 
constitutional interpretation.  Justice Cushing expressed 
doubt that an interpretation rendering the federal 
government suable was “necessary” as a matter of 
constitutional interpretation:  
 
[w]hen speaking of the United States, the Constitution 
says ‘controversies to which the United States shall be a 
party’ not controversies between the United States and 
any of their citizens . . . [whereas] [w]hen speaking of 
States, [the Constitution] says, ‘controversies between two 
or more states; between a state and citizens of another 
state.’16
Chief Justice Jay agreed with Cushing, further explaining 
this interpretation of Article III: “[I]f the word party 
comprehends both Plaintiff and Defendant, it follows, that the 
 
 
 13. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 420, 469 (1793) (Jay, C.J.), 
superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 14. See id. at 479. 
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 16. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 469 (Cushing, J.) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, 
cl. 1). 
BRINTON FINAL 5/23/201412:39 PM 
244 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54 
United States may be sued by any citizen, between whom and 
them there may be a controversy.”17  Jay questioned whether 
the Court had the authority to enforce judgments against the 
other federal branches, but he expressed hope that suits 
against the United States would lead to meaningful 
government redress.18  Despite their doubts about federal 
sovereign immunity, both Cushing19 and Jay20 agreed it was 
not necessary to decide the question in Chisholm.  The other 
justices did not comment on the federal analog to the state 
sovereign immunity issue before them.  Although the hasty 
passage of the Eleventh Amendment reinstated state 
sovereign immunity,21
The Court did not address the question of federal 
sovereign immunity until almost two decades later,
 federal sovereign immunity was 
unaffected by the amendment process. 
22 but 
early cases such as Marbury v. Madison seemed to establish 
that citizens could seek redress against the government in 
federal courts without congressional approval.23  The 
defendant in Marbury was James Madison in his role as 
Secretary of State.  The plaintiff, William Marbury, felt 
himself injured by Madison’s official actions as a federal 
executive officer.  In resolving their dispute, the Court 
reasoned through a federal sovereign immunity-type 
question: “[i]f he [Marbury] has a right, and that right has 
been violated, do the laws of his country afford him a 
remedy?”24  After noting that “[i]n Great Britain the king 
himself is sued in the respectful form of a petition, and he 
never fails to comply with the judgment of his court,”25
 
 17. Id. at 478 (Jay, C.J.). 
 and 
quoting repeatedly from Blackstone’s Commentaries about 
the propriety of redress for all legal wrongs, the Court held 
that Madison’s role as government actor did not prevent 
 18. Id.  Chief Justice Jay opined: “I wish the State of society was so far 
improved, and the science of Government advanced to such a degree of 
perfection, as that the whole nation could in the peaceable course of law, be 
compelled to do justice, and be sued by individual citizens.”  Id. 
 19. See id. at 469 (Cushing, J.). 
 20. Id. at 478 (Jay, C.J.). 
 21. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 22. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 264 (1821). 
 23. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 24. Id. at 162. 
 25. Id. at 163. 
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suit.26  When read as a sovereign immunity case—rather than 
merely a case about the constitutionality of judicial review—
the Court’s famous words take on additional meaning: “[t]he 
government of the United States has been emphatically 
termed a government of laws, and not of men.  It will 
certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws 
furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.”27  
Despite an absence of congressional authorization, the Court 
allowed the case against Marbury to proceed.28
Almost twenty years later, and without any intervening 
on-the-record discussion, the Court issued this statement: 
“The universally received opinion is, [sic] that no suit can be 
commenced or prosecuted against the United States . . . 
[because] the Judiciary Act does not authorize such suits.”
 
29  
Apparently, between 1803 and 1821, the Court had made up 
its mind about federal sovereign immunity—in a way 
contrary to Marbury.  The Court’s opinion in Cohens v. 
Virginia does not cite to any case (not even to the Justices’ 
discussions in Chisholm), statute, or constitutional provision 
as a source for an American federal sovereign immunity.  The 
Court does not even discuss the doctrine’s origin. Rather, the 
Court merely asserts it, virtually ex nihilo, as a sort of default 
legal truism.  It does the same for each of its subsequent 
nineteenth-century iterations of the doctrine.30
 
 26. Id. at 166. 
 
 27. Marbury, 5 U.S. 137 at 163. The Court’s reasoning on this issue was 
ultimately more nuanced than across-the-board government immunity waiver. 
The Court indicated that some actions by federal officials would be 
“examinable” but others would not, an issue determinable by examining 
conferred rights of discretion.  See id. at 166.  If, by the Constitution or by 
statute a government official is given discretion to perform acts, those acts are 
not reviewable by the courts.  See id.  Moreover, the Court stated: 
[W]here the heads of departments are the political or confidential 
agents of the executive, merely to execute the will of the president, or 
rather to act in cases in which the executive possesses a constitutional 
or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their 
acts are only politically examinable. 
Id.  The Court added, “[b]ut where a specific duty is assigned by law, and 
individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally 
clear that the individual who considers himself injured, has a right to resort to 
the laws of his country for a remedy.”  Id. 
 28. Id. at 167. 
 29. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 410 (1821). 
 30. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 205 (1882) (“There is vested in 
no officer or body the authority to consent that the state shall be sued except in 
the law-making power, which may give such consent on the terms it may choose 
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The 1821 Cohens decision marked a second turn in the 
Court’s jurisprudence.  In addition to assuming that federal 
sovereign immunity exists as a protective doctrine, the Court 
also identified Congress as the sole authorized branch of 
government capable of waiving immunity.  After noting that 
“no suit can be commenced . . . against the United States,” the 
Court pointed out that “the judiciary act [presumably, the 
Judiciary Act of 1789] does not authorize such suits.”31
Once the Court decided federal immunity existed and 
that only Congress could waive it, the Court never wavered.  
It repeatedly asserted the doctrine of federal sovereign 
immunity throughout the nineteenth century, but those 
assertions were never accompanied by any explanation of the 
source of the doctrine or by supporting legal reasoning.
  The 
Court did not discuss its assumption that Congress could 
waive the immunity, nor does it cite to authority for that 
principle.  Rather, it assumed that whatever federal 
sovereign immunity would exist in a post-monarchical 
America, Congress would control it. 
32
When the Court finally issued an opinion addressing the 
origins of federal sovereign immunity and the arguments for 
its place in American jurisprudence, it was 1882, and the 
doctrine was, by then, well established as legal precedent.
 
33  
In U.S. v. Lee, the Court nevertheless pointed out the poor fit 
between federal sovereign immunity and the United States’ 
constitutional structure.34
 
to impose.”); The Davis, 77 U.S. (1 Wall.) 15, 15 (1869) (“[The United States] 
cannot be subjected to legal proceedings at law or in equity without their 
consent, and that whoever institutes such proceedings must bring his case 
within the authority of some act of Congress.”); The Siren, 74 U.S. (1 Wall.) 152, 
154 (1868) (“[T]he United States . . . cannot be subjected to legal proceedings at 
law or in equity without their consent; and whoever institutes such proceedings 
must bring his case within the authority of some act of Congress.”); United 
States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (1 How.) 286, 288 (1846) (“[T]he government is not 
liable to be sued, except with its own consent, given by law”); United States v. 
Clarke, 33 U.S. (1 Pet.) 436, 443 (1834) (“As the United States are not suable of 
common right, the party who institutes such suit must bring his case within the 
authority of some act of congress, or the court cannot exercise jurisdiction over 
it.”); Cohens 19 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 410 (“The universally received opinion is, [sic] 
that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted against the United States; that 
the judiciary act does not authorize such suits.”). 
  The Court further discussed—and 
 31. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 410. 
 32. See cases cited supra note 30.  
 33. Lee, 106 U.S. 196. 
 34. Id. at 208 (“But little weight can be given to the decisions of the English 
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rejected—a number of reasons for the doctrine, including the 
absurdity35 and denigration36 of requiring a sovereign to 
appear in its own court, and the potential for interference 
with the actions of a “supreme executive power” by individual 
citizens and the judicial branch.37  The Court noted that “the 
principle [of federal sovereign immunity] has never been 
discussed or the reasons for it given.”38  Despite this 
disapprobation and doubt, the Court nevertheless affirmed 
the doctrine on the grounds that it had “always been treated 
as an established doctrine,” citing to an 1834 Supreme Court 
opinion for authority.39
Lee marks a brief detour in the history of federal 
sovereign immunity jurisprudence.  The Court openly 
questioned the rationale for the doctrine in a way that it 
never had and never has since.  But Lee is important, not 
because it questioned the rationale for federal sovereign 
immunity, but because, despite questioning the doctrine, the 
Court nevertheless affirmed the doctrine.
  The Court yielded to court precedent, 
and an unreasoned principle maintained its position in 
American jurisprudence. 
40
Throughout history, the court treatment of sovereign 
immunity makes clear that the United States Supreme Court 
is the real father of modern-day federal sovereign immunity 
jurisprudence.
  Thus, even at its 
most skeptical, the Court held the doctrine of federal 
sovereign immunity to be so fundamental that, despite its 




courts on this branch of the subject [national sovereign immunity], for [a] 
reason . . . found in the vast difference in the essential character of the two 
governments as regards the source and the depositaries of power. . . .  Under 
our system the people, who are there called subjects, are the sovereign.”).  
  The Court articulated the notion of federal 
sovereign immunity.  It then enunciated its exclusive reliance 
upon Congress for waiver (hereinafter “exclusive 
congressional waiver”), and reaffirmed this idea until the 
 35. Id. at 206. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. (quoting Briggs v. The Lights Boats, 93 Mass. (1 Allen) 157, 162–63 
(1865)). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Lee, 106 U.S. at 207. 
 40. Id. 
 41. For Justice Stevens’s discussion of the Court’s role in the creation of the 
federal sovereign immunity doctrine, see Stevens, supra note 8, at 1123–24. 
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other branches of government and the people adopted it too. 
Today, federal sovereign immunity is a well-entrenched 
doctrine.42  Although criticisms of its constitutionality 
abound,43 a central feature of the doctrine—exclusive 
congressional waiver—has received no criticism. Few scholars 
have addressed it, and those who have expressed only partial 
defenses of its application.44
B. The Current Landscape 
  These defenses cannot explain 
the application of exclusive congressional waiver to the entire 
current sovereign immunity landscape. 
Although Congress waited “[t]hree quarters of a century 
 . . . after the ratification of the Constitution before . . . 
[enacting] the first significant grant” of sovereign immunity 
waiver,45 after it did, it began to demonstrate an increased 
interest in legislating waiver laws.46
 
 42. Susan Randall, Sovereign Immunity and the Uses of History, 81 NEB L. 
REV. 1, 6 (2002) (“Time and tradition have, of course, embedded the mistake of 
sovereign immunity in our legal culture.”). 
  Rather than waiving 
sovereign immunity once and for all—a total withdrawal of 
sovereign immunity’s “blanket exemption for the 
 43. See, e.g., Nagle, supra note 5, at 775 n.24 (noting that “[n]o scholar, so 
far as can be ascertained, has had a good word for sovereign immunity for many 
years”) (quoting Roger C. Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal 
Administrative Action: The Need for of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68 MICH. L. REV. 389, 392 (1970)); id. 
(stating that “nearly every commentator who considers the subject vigorously 
asserts that the doctrine of sovereign immunity must go”) (quoting KENNETH 
CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 25.01, at 435–36 (1958)); 
Menashi, supra note 4 at 1138 (“[T]he American doctrine of sovereign immunity 
is indefensible upon both theoretical and pragmatic grounds. . . .”) (quoting 
CLYDE JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 160 
(1972)); Sisk, supra note 4, at 525 (“From the founding of our nation, the mantle 
of sovereign immunity has rested uneasily on a government designed to be 
limited in powers and understood to draw its authority from the people.”); 
Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 1201 (“Sovereign immunity is an anachronistic 
concept, derived from long-discredited royal prerogatives, and . . . it is 
inconsistent with basic principles of the American legal system.”). 
 44. See infra Part I.C. 
 45. Sisk, supra note 4, at 530. The first waiver of sovereign immunity 
created limited liability for the federal government in a newly created Court of 
Claims.  Id. at 530–31. 
 46. See, e.g., Federal Housing Administration v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 245 
(1940); Gregory C. Sisk, The Inevitability of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 55 
VILL. L. REV. 899, 922–23 (2010); Sisk, supra note 4, at 517–18; Floyd D. 
Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the United States: The Evolution 
from A Legislative Toward A Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REV. 625, 
690–91 (1985). 
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government”47—Congress has enacted various statutes 
waiving sovereign immunity for particular kinds of suits.  The 
resulting sovereign immunity regime has been praised as a 
“broad tapestry of authorized judicial actions against the 
federal government”48 and criticized as “a jerry-built 
structure, a patchwork, a doctrinal stew.”49
The heterogeneous nature of the current state of 
congressional waiver is illustrated by three of Congress’s 
most important statutory waiver creations: (1) the U.S. Court 
of Claims
 
50 and the Tucker Act51; (2) the Federal Tort Claims 
Act (FTCA)52; and (3) the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA).53  Congress created the U.S. Court of Claims in 1855 
to permit the court to investigate and advise contract claims 
brought against the federal government.54  But in 1863, 
Congress amended this organic act to give the court binding 
authority to resolve claims brought before it.55  In 1887, the 
Tucker Act expanded the Court of Claims’s jurisdiction to 
hear constitutional and other non-tort claims for money 
damages in the U.S. Court of Claims.56
In the late 1940s, Congress passed two additional 
statutes—the FTCA and the APA—which soon became 
bulwarks of government immunity waiver.
  Until the mid-
twentieth century, the Tucker Act and the Court of Claims 




 47. Sisk, supra note 4, at 538. 
  The FTCA grew 
 48. Gregory C. Sisk, The Tapestry Unravels: Statutory Waivers of Sovereign 
Immunity and Money Claims Against the United States, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
602–03 (2003). 
 49. PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING  GOVERNMENT 51 (1983). 
 50. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612, 612 (codified as amended 
at 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)) (stating the Court of Claims “shall hear and 
determine all claims founded upon any law of Congress, . . . any regulation of an 
executive department, or . . . any contract, express or implied, with the 
government of the United States”). 
 51. Tucker Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505, 505 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. § 1491). 
 52. Federal Tort Claim Act, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 982, 983–85 (1948) (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2)). 
 53. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 551). 
 54. See 10 Stat. 612. 
 55. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92, 12 Stat. 765, 768 (amending 10 Stat. 612). 
 56. See 24 Stat. 505. 
 57. Sisk, supra note 48, at 603. 
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out of a growing congressional sentiment that “the 
Government should assume the obligation to pay for damages 
for the misfeasance of employees in carrying out its work.”58  
When an army plane crashed into the Empire State Building 
on July 28, 1945, engulfing two floors in flames, killing ten, 
and injuring others, Congress quickly acted to pass legislation 
that would allow suit against the government for these 
damages.59  The FTCA waived immunity for most tort suits 
brought against the federal government under state law, and 
it was backdated to allow for claims accrued in 1945 
(including the Empire State Building crash).60
Like the FTCA, the APA was enacted in 1946, but unlike 
the FTCA, it was codified without a clear sovereign immunity 
waiver.  As originally enacted, the APA provided for suit 
against the government to “any person suffering legal wrong 
because of any agency action, or adversely affected or 
aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any relevant 
statute,”
 
61 but without any explicit waiver of sovereign 
immunity.  Thus, courts were left to decide for themselves if 
Congress had intended to waive immunity for claims brought 
for equitable relief against the government.  They did so 
inconsistently and with confusion.62
 
 58. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24 (1953). 
  Accordingly, Congress 
enacted an amended version of 5 U.S.C. § 702, this time 
including an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity: 
 59. See Sisk, supra note 4, at 535–36. 
 60. Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. § 2671). 
 61. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237, 243 (1946) (codified 
as amended at 5 USC § 702). 
 62. See, e.g., Schlafly v. Volpe, 495 F.2d 273, 282 (7th Cir. 1974) (stating 
that while the APA, alone may not represent a waiver of sovereign immunity, 
the passage of certain statutes qualify consent by the sovereign to be sued); 
Knox Hill Tenants Council v. Washington, 448 F.2d 1045, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1971) 
(holding that district court erred in negating its own jurisdiction by reason of 
sovereign immunity); Littell v. Morton, 445 F.2d 1207, 1212 (4th Cir. 1971) 
(holding that APA does not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity); Penn v. 
Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700, 703 (5th Cir. 1974), rev’d en banc, 497 F.2d 970 (5th 
Cir. 1974) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 does not constitute a waiver because it 
“contains no explicit waiver of sovereign immunity by the federal government.”) 
(emphasis added); Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Callaway, 398 F. Supp. 176, 191 
(N.D. Ala. 1975) (stating that waiver applies in suits where “the plaintiff seeks 
injunctive relief alone.”). See also H.R. REP. No. 94-1656, at 6 (1976) (discussing 
these cases and the difficulty courts had discerning the applicability of 
sovereign immunity to actions for equitable relief against the government).  
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An action in a court of the United States seeking relief 
other than money damages and stating a claim that an 
agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to 
act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority 
shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the 
ground that it is against the United States or that the 
United States is an indispensable party.63
This provision supplies the waiver necessary for actions 
brought under the APA.  The Supreme Court has further held 
that the section 702 waiver of sovereign immunity applies to 




Together, the Tucker Act, the FTCA, and the APA 
comprise three of Congress’s most important waivers of 
sovereign immunity.  Although under these three statutes 
individuals can bring suits against the government for money 
damages arising from contract or tort or for equitable relief, 
limitations and exceptions cabin each waiver.
 
65  Additionally, 
Congress has enacted more than ten other major legislative 
waivers, each with its own exceptions and limitations.66
 
  
Whatever the merits of these waivers, it is clear that 
Congress has believed the Court when it said Congress could 
act to waive immunity. And waive it has. 
 
 63. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721, 2721 (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 702). 
 64. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977). 
 65. E.g., Tucker Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505, 505 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1500) (stating that the “United States Court of Federal 
Claims shall not have jurisdiction of any claim for or in respect to which the 
plaintiff or his assignee has pending in any other court any suit or process 
against the United States or any person who, at the time when the cause of 
action alleged in such suit or process arose, was, in respect thereto, acting or 
professing to act, directly or indirectly under the authority of the United 
States”).  The FTCA does not allow suits against the United States for “[a]ny 
claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, . . . libel, 
slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.”  28 
U.S.C. § 2680 (2000).  The APA only allows suits for which there is “no other 
adequate remedy in a court.”  5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006). 
 66. These include, among others, the Privacy Act, Title VII, Title IX, the 
Freedom of Information Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age 
Discrimination Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Ethics in 
Government Act, and the Occupational Safety and Health Act.  See Floyd D. 
Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the United States: The Evolution 
from A Legislative Toward A Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REV. 625 
(1985).  
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A review of administrative agency materials reveals that 
executive practice reinforces this notion of exclusive 
congressional waiver.  Administrative documents make clear 
that executive agencies have refrained from acting when they 
believe doing so would expand waiver without congressional 
approval.  For example, in a response to comments on a 
proposed regulation regarding the subpoena powers of the 
Provider Reimbursement Review Board (the Board), an 
administrative court for the Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) asserted that it could not authorize 
the Board to subpoena documents from government agencies 
because Congress had not expressly waived immunity to that 
effect.67
[W]e believe there is no statutory basis for the Board to 
subpoena HHS and other Federal agencies.  The United 
States and its agencies, as sovereign, are immune from 
suit, except to the extent to which they consent to be sued. 
. . . There is no indication in the language of sections 
205(d) and 205(e) of the Act, or in the legislative history of 
those sections, that the Congress intended to effect a 
waiver of sovereign immunity. . . . Because only the 
Congress, and not Federal agencies, has the authority to 
waive sovereign immunity, (see United States v. N.Y. 
Rayon Importing Co., 329 U.S. 654, 660 (1947)), we would 
be unable to subject HHS and other agencies to the 
Board’s subpoena authority even if we were otherwise so 
inclined.
  CMS explained: 
68
To make absolutely clear that it would not act in a way 
that would appear to waive immunity without congressional 
authorization, CMS then opted to add clarifying language to 
the proposed regulation “in order to prevent any implication 




Other administrative documents reveal similar and 
widespread executive deference to congressional waiver.  
Federal agencies regularly assert congressional failure to 
waive immunity as a reason not to promulgate certain 
regulations or take actions, including those requested or 
 
 
 67. Medicare Program; Provider Reimbursement Determinations and 
Appeals, 73 Fed. Reg. 30190, 30223 (May 23, 2008) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. 
pts. 405, 413, 417). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
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suggested by the public.  For instance, agencies have asserted 
Congress’s failure to waive immunity as a reason they could 
not participate in “court-annexed” arbitration proceedings70; 
settle claims outside of court71; pay damages for failure to 
comply with legal process72; approve state programs that 
would require vehicles operated on federal installations to 
adhere to state vehicle regulations73; pay interest for back pay 
awarded in employment discrimination cases74 or other 
judgments against the government75; and approve state 
regulations that would impose particular environmental 
compliance burdens on military munitions sites.76  These 
refusals are unaccompanied by other supporting rationales; 
rather, the agencies rely solely on Congress’s immunity 
decisions to justify their own inaction.77
 
 70. Policy Statements; Local Court Rules Requiring Mandatory Arbitration, 
50 Fed. Reg. 40524, 40524 (Oct. 4, 1985) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 50). 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. See, e.g., Processing Garnishment Orders for Child Support and Alimony 
and Commercial Garnishment of Federal Employees’ Pay, 62 Fed. Reg. 31763 
(June 11, 1997) (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. pt. 581, 582); Garnishment of Postal 
Employee Salaries, 59 Fed. Reg. 45625 (Sept. 2, 1994) (to be codified at 39 
C.F.R. pt. 491); Garnishment of Postal Employee Salaries, 63 Fed. Reg. 67403, 
(Dec. 7, 1998) (to be codified at 39 C.F.R. pt. 491). 
 73. See, e.g., Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Nevada; 
Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance Program, 73 Fed. Reg. 55466 (Sept. 25, 
2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52); Approval of Implementation Plans and 
Designation of Areas for Air Quality Planning Purposes; Nevada, 73 Fed. Reg. 
1175 (Jan. 7, 2008) (to be codified 40 C.F.R. pt. 52, pt. 81); 74 Fed. Reg. 3975 
(Jan. 22, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (same result); Privacy and 
Disclosure of Official Records and Information, 72 Fed. Reg. 20935, 20937 (Apr. 
27, 2007) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 401); Approval of Implementation Plans 
and Designation of Areas for Air Quality Planning Purposes; Nevada, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 38124 (Jul. 3, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52, pt. 81); Approval of 
Air Quality Implementation Plans; Delaware; Enhanced Motor Vehicle 
Inspection and Maintenance, 64 Fed. Reg. 52657 (Sept. 30, 1999) (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52); Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; State 
of Missouri, 68 Fed. Reg. 25414 (May 12, 2003) (to be codified 40 C.F.R. pt. 52). 
 74. See, e.g., Federal Sector Equal Employment Opportunity, 57 Fed. Reg. 
12634 (Apr. 10, 1992) (to be codified 29 C.F.R. pt. 1614); Administrative Practice 
and Procedure, 54 Fed. Reg. 24131, 24135 (Jun. 6, 1989) (to be codified 4 C.F.R. 
pts. 27, 28). 
 75. Obtaining Payments From the Judgment Fund and Under Private 
Relief Bills, 71 Fed. Reg. 60848 (Oct. 17, 2006) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 
256). 
 76. Military Munitions Rule: Hazardous Waste Identification and 
Management; Explosives Emergencies; Redefinition of On-Site, 60 Fed. Reg. 
56468 (Nov. 8, 1995) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 260–265, 270). 
 77. See, e.g., Medicare Program; Provider Reimbursement Determinations 
and Appeals, 73 Fed. Reg. 30190, 30223 (May 23, 2008) (to be codified at 42 
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And, as discussed above, the Supreme Court still insists 
that Congress has the exclusive waiver authority.78  Exclusive 
congressional waiver is the basis for the judicial doctrine that 
without an express statutory waiver of federal sovereign 
immunity, suits against the government must be dismissed.  
Exclusive congressional waiver also undergirds the Court’s 
sovereign immunity interpretive canon, which directs courts 
to interpret strictly any statutory waiver of immunity in favor 
of the Government.79  This interpretive canon is based on the 
judicial concern that Congress, not the courts, has authority 
for waiver.80
C. The Scholarly Defense 
  In preserving the canon, the Court has 
preserved reliance on exclusive congressional waiver. 
Like the federal branches, legal academics, too, take for 
granted that the waiver authority resides with Congress.81
 
C.F.R. pts. 405, 413, 417) (“Because only the Congress, and not Federal 
agencies, has the authority to waive sovereign immunity, . . . we would be 
unable to subject HHS and other agencies to the Board’s subpoena authority 
even if we were otherwise so inclined.” citing United States v. N.Y. Rayon 
Importing Co., 329 U.S. 654, 660 (1947))). 
  
Some state it quite strongly: “[Y]ou cannot sue the United 
States, for any reason or any form of relief, unless Congress 
 78. See supra Part I.A. 
 79. See, e.g., Fed. Aviation Admin. v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1448 (2012) 
(“We have said on many occasions that a waiver of sovereign immunity must be 
‘unequivocally expressed’ in statutory text.” (quoting Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 
187, 192 (1996))); FDIC. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 474 (1994) (parsing statutory 
text to determine if sovereign immunity is waived); United States v. Nordic 
Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 39 (1992) (“Since Congress has not empowered a 
bankruptcy court to order a recovery of money from the United States, the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed.”); Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans 
Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990) (noting that Congress must create sovereign 
immunity waivers, which the Court then interprets); United States v. Mitchell, 
445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (“In the absence of clear congressional consent [to suit], 
then, ‘there is no jurisdiction in the Court of Claims more than in any other 
court to entertain suits against the United States.’ ”  (quoting United States v. 
Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 587–88 (1941))). 
 80. United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969). 
 81. See, e.g., SISK, supra note 11, at 341 n.5 (“Such consent can be had only 
by formal legislative action.”); Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: 
Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L. L. 
REV. 521, 570 (2003) (“What we call the ‘sovereign immunity’ of the United 
States in many respects could be described as a particularized elaboration of 
Congress’ control over the lower court’s jurisdiction.”); ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., & 
WILLIAM T. MAYON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 539 (2d ed. 2001) (“Sovereign 
immunity may be waived, but only by legislative act.”); Jaffe, supra note 12, at 2 
(“If there was any successor to the King qua sovereign it was the legislature.”). 
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has expressly consented by statute to be sued.”82  Or “the 
doctrine of federal sovereign immunity stands as a bar to the 
lawsuit unless and until Congress chooses to lift that bar and 
then only to the extent or degree that Congress chooses to do 
so.”83
A few scholars have attempted to present a merited 
defense of the doctrine, however.  The preeminent piece on 
exclusive congressional waiver is Harold Krent’s landmark 
Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity,
  In fact, no scholars have questioned the validity of 
exclusive congressional waiver. 
84 which explores the 
justifications for Congress’s primary role in the sovereign 
immunity waiver.  Krent’s piece couches its argument as a 
defense of sovereign immunity, but it is at heart a defense of 
exclusive congressional waiver.  He ably argues that because 
Congress is politically accountable both to the public and to 
the President (through the veto power), it is uniquely 
qualified to “determine when to rely on the political process to 
safeguard majoritarian policy.”85  Krent worries that a 
legislative branch powerless to decide when to waive 
immunity will be bound inextricably to the policy preferences 
of judges, or will be afraid to act for fear of committing 
judicially cognizable torts.86  Further, that a Congress unable 
to decide the immunity question might also be bound by the 
“dead hand of Congresses past,” whose decisions regarding 
contracts and other government obligations might “prevent[] 
contemporary Congresses from pursuing current concerns as 
effectively.”87  Krent notes that the Executive also benefits 
from Congress’s waiver authority: “[s]overeign immunity, 
therefore, allows Congress to immunize the executive branch 
from any judicial review when the costs of such review are too 
great.”88
But Krent notes that these justifications for exclusive 




 82. LAWSON, supra note 11, at 800. 
 and 
 83. SISK, supra note 11. 
 84. Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 VAND. L. 
REV. 1529 (1992). 
 85. Id. at 1532. 
 86. Id. at 1530–31. 
 87. Id. at 1530. 
 88. Id. at 1536. 
 89. Id. at 1541. 
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contract90 law.  His arguments in favor of congressional 
waiver are developed exclusively in these common law areas.  
He intentionally omits from his defense of congressional 
waiver the issue of constitutional violations.91  As Krent 
writes, “Indeed, there is presumably less justification for 
judicial review of policymaking in the tort and contract 
contexts than in the constitutional setting.”92
Just as Krent cabins his arguments to areas in which 
exclusive congressional waiver makes most sense, Professors 
Paul Figley and Jay Tidmarsh also offer a limited defense of 
exclusive congressional waiver.
  Thus, Krent’s 
arguments in support of exclusive congressional waiver rivet 
to only a portion of current sovereign immunity practice. 
93  Although Figley and 
Tidmarsh couch their argument broadly—they claim to have 
located a constitutional source for sovereign immunity in the 
Appropriations Clause of the Constitution—their detailed 
historical justification of exclusive congressional waiver 
focuses solely on immunity against damages.94  Tracing the 
history of the appropriations power in England, they argue 
that the Article I Section 9 Clause 7 granted legislative 
control over money as a mirror of parliamentary control over 
the purse.95  Figley and Tidmarsh state their case strongly: 
“the history of the Appropriations Clause reflects, from the 
outset, that its meaning was never disputed as a matter of 
principle and its import was clear.  Absent Congressional 
assent, the Clause precluded suits against the federal 
government for damages.”96  They do not attempt to present a 
constitutional source—or historical justification—for 
Congress’s control of the waiver authority in cases against the 
government for equitable relief.97
 
 90. Id. at 1560. 
 
 91. Id. at 1535 (“There is no need here to replay the ongoing debate over a 
theory supporting judicial review of constitutional questions. Suffice it to say 
that the justification for judicial review is at its nadir when judges supplant the 
policymaking of the majority.”). 
 92. Id.  
 93. See Paul F. Figley & Jay Tidmarsh, The Appropriations Power and 
Sovereign Immunity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1207 (2009). 
 94. See id. at 1209. 
 95. See id. at 1258. 
 96. Id. at 1264. 
 97. Figley and Tidmarsh refer to “suits brought against the United States 
for damages” as “the central category” of “eight distinct categories of immunity.” 
Id. at 1209.  These categories are: 
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Unfortunately, these scholars’ thoughtful defenses of 
exclusive congressional waiver in cases involving torts, 
contract, and damages do not account for the breadth of the 
sovereign immunity doctrine described in Part I.A above.  
Recall that each branch of the government accords to 
Congress the exclusive right to waive immunity—even in 
cases that are not tort, contract, or damages.  For instance, in 
the APA, Congress has waived immunity for cases expressly 
not involving money damages.98  The executive has declined 
to subpoena documents from the government, citing a lack of 
congressional waiver for injunctions of that kind.99  And the 
Court has refused to find an exception to a statute of 
limitations, solely on the basis that doing otherwise would 
override congressional judgment about what equity 
requires100
II. TWO-DIMENSIONAL IMMUNITY: WAIVER BY CONGRESS, 
WAIVER BY COURT 
—equity, a quintessential element of judicial 
prerogative.  Legal academia has yet to provide a coherent 
justification for these expressions of exclusive congressional 
waiver.  Nor can it.  As this Article will argue, the 
Constitution does not afford Congress a true exclusive waiver 
power. 
The argument that Congress must share the waiver 
authority is a simple one.  The Constitution requires that the 
 
(1) sovereign immunity for the United States against suits seeking 
damages; (2) sovereign immunity for the United States against 
suits seeking injunctive relief; (3) sovereign immunity for federal 
officials against suits seeking damages; (4) sovereign immunity for 
federal officials against suits seeking injunctive relief; (5) sovereign 
immunity for a state against suits seeking damages; (6) sovereign 
immunity for a state against suits seeking injunctive relief; (7) 
sovereign immunity for state officials against suits seeking 
damages; and (8) sovereign immunity for state officials against 
suits seeking injunctive relief. In categories 3, 4, 7, and 8, a further 
division can be made between official-capacity suits and individual-
capacity suits.  
Id. at 1209 n.7. This Article assumes that a coherent account of the federal 
sovereign immunity doctrine must address both categories 1 and 2, at least.  Id. 
at 1209. 
 98. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). 
 99. See Medicare Program; Provider Reimbursement Determinations and 
Appeals, 73 Fed. Reg. 30190, 30223 (May 23, 2008) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. 
pts. 405, 413, 417). 
 100. United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 610 (1990). 
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Supreme Court serve as a check against the other branches’ 
unconstitutional behavior.101
A. The Court and the Constitution 
  Therefore, the Supreme Court 
cannot defer to Congress the exclusive ability to waive 
immunity.  The Court must, at a minimum, retain the right 
to waive immunity in cases in which plaintiff(s) claim the 
government has acted unconstitutionally.  Accordingly, the 
waiver power is one that must be shared by at least Congress 
and the Court. 
The Court’s power to review the constitutionality of other 
branch actions, even without congressional approval, is 
rooted in the Constitution.  The debate surrounding this 
proposition is too extensive to repeat here.  Suffice it to say, it 
is as old as Marbury v. Madison, in which the Court asserted 
its authority to review the constitutionality of legislation.102  
The Court has likewise claimed a right to review executive 
action, perhaps most famously in Youngstown Sheet and Tube 
Co.103
Of course, court assertions of power are themselves 
invalid unless they stem from actual constitutional grants.  
Professors Richard Fallon and Daniel Meltzer have defended 
court review of constitutional questions on the basis of 
constitutional structure: “Constitutional remedies serve . . . to 
reinforce structural values, including those underlying the 
separation of powers and the rule of law.”
 
104  Because the 
framers feared the possibility of arbitrary and tyrannical 
political branches, Fallon and Meltzer argue, they created the 
judiciary “to represent the people’s continuing interest in the 
protection of long-term values.”105  According to Fallon and 
Meltzer, the Court serves as this check, not by remedying 
every individual violation, but by “ensur[ing] that government 
generally respects constitutional values.”106
 
 101. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-
Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1787–88 
(1991) (“The Constitution thus contemplates a judicial ‘check’ on the political 
branches not merely to redress particular violations, but to ensure that 
government generally respects constitutional values . . . .”). 
 
 102. 5 U.S. 137 (1 Cranch), 162 (1803). 
 103. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 104. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 101, at 1787. 
 105. Id. at 1788. 
 106. Id. 
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The Court’s role as final constitutional arbiter derives 
from its place in the constitutional system.  Its 
determinations of constitutionality are unreviewable by any 
other branch and are, in fact, only remediable by the hugely 
cumbersome amendment process.107  The Court has a peculiar 
responsibility to monitor governmental action accountability, 
and it has the power to do so.108  The Constitution expressly 
authorizes the Court to hear “controversies to which the 
United States shall be a party.”109  While this clause is open 
to interpretation, it is certainly arguable that within the 
Court’s irreducible minimum of constitutional jurisdiction is 
the ability to hear claims against the federal government.110  
This is particularly true where constitutional questions are at 
issue, given the Court’s “judicial power” to hear “all cases, in 
law and equity, arising under this Constitution.”111
As the final constitutional arbiter, the Court must be able 
to hear claims against the government, even if Congress does 
not want judicial review.  Allowing Congress to remove from 
the Court the power to hear constitutional questions, 
including those against the federal government, would 
remove from the Court the power to fulfill its constitutional 
responsibility to support “this Constitution” as the “supreme 
law of the land.”
 
112
The Court’s ability to hear constitutional claims in the 
absence of congressional approval is fairly well established.  
The Court’s creation of Bivens actions is an example of the 
Court’s use of this constitutional gatekeeping power.
  That is something neither the 
Constitution nor the Court may allow Congress to do. 
113
 
 107. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
  After 
 108. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See, e.g., Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1 Dall.), 478 (1793) (Jay, C.J.). 
 111. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. cl. 1. 
 112. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 113. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388 (1971).  In Bivens, the Court held that a private citizen had a right to 
sue federal agents for damages when those agents had allegedly acted 
unconstitutionally, even though Congress had not authorized such a suit or 
remedy.  Id. at 397.  As the Court wrote, 
it is well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a 
federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, 
federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong 
done.  The present case involves no special factors counseling 
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress. 
Id. at 396 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)). 
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Bivens, an individual could file a claim for money damages 
against an individual officer, though only if there are not 
what the Court calls “special factors counseling hesitation in 
the absence of affirmative action by Congress,” and only if 
“Congress has [not] provided an alternative remedy which it 
explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly 
under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective.”114  
Bivens counsels that courts hesitate to hear these 
constitutional money damages claims if Congress has acted, 
but Bivens actions themselves are authorized directly by the 
Court—not by Congress.115
Although Bivens actions are alleged against individual 
officers and not against the government itself—and therefore 
not a pure example of court-created sovereign immunity 
waiver—they exemplify the Court’s constitutionally conferred 
authority to independently authorize suits (1) despite the 
absence of congressional authorization if (2) constitutional 
challenges are raised.
 
116  The Court has resisted congressional 
attempts to divest the judiciary of jurisdiction to hear 
constitutional questions.  For instance, in Califano v. 
Sanders, the Court found that it was uniquely qualified to 
hear constitutional questions, despite statutory review 
schemes that seemed to “effectively have closed the federal 
forum to the adjudication of colorable constitutional 
claims.”117  The Court rejected a reading of the statute that 
would remove constitutional questions from its review 
because “access to the courts is essential to the decision of 
such questions.”118
Similarly, in Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce 
Corp., the Court expressly retained its authority to hear 
  In other words, even if Congress wanted 
the Court to turn a blind eye to the constitutionality of a 
question, the Court would not.  Constitutional review is its 
prerogative, and Congress (or, for that matter, the executive) 
lacks authority to amend or withdraw a delegation made by 
the people themselves. 
 
 114. Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Bivens Actions—United States 
Supreme Court Cases, 22 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 159, § 2 (2007). 
 115. Id.  
 116. See Bivens, 403 U.S. 388 at 389.  
 117. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977). 
 118. Id. 
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constitutional claims against the government.119  As the Court 
wrote, “[u]nder our constitutional system, certain rights are 
protected against governmental action and, if such rights are 
infringed by the actions of officers of the Government, it is 
proper that the courts have the power to grant relief against 
those actions.”120
Professor Walter Dellinger makes the point clearly: 
“[T]he failure of Congress to authorize suits against the 
Treasury may no more bar a judicially created remedy than 
the failure of Congress to create a cause of action against the 
officer barred the development of that particular remedy in 
Bivens.”
 
121  He explains that an often-cited justification for 
sovereign immunity—”there can be no legal right against the 
authority that makes the law upon which the right 
depends”—is inapposite.122  Dellinger writes, “[I]n a 
constitutional case, the right involved does not ‘depend’ upon 
the government, but rather arises from the basic law which 
created and seeks to control that government.”123
Notably, the Court’s authority on constitutional text is 
greater than its authority on statutory or regulatory text.  If 
Congress passes a law to mean X, and the Court interprets it 
to mean Y, then all that need happen to restore the law to its 
X meaning is for Congress to enact a new law (or an 
amendment) clarifying the law’s meaning as X.  This new law 
may of course be subject to judicial review, but this scheme—
as constitutionally envisioned—differs markedly from that 
involving constitutional texts.  The same is true for cases 
involving regulations, although the subsequent clarification 
can either be adopted by Congress via statutory override or it 
can be promulgated by an Executive agency via the 
regulatory process. 
 
For cases involving either statutory or regulatory 
questions, the Court’s interpretation can be overcome by 
subsequent branch action, without resort to popular 
involvement and the amendment process.  The Constitution, 
then, creates a different relationship between the judiciary 
 
 119. 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution As a 
Sword, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1532, 1557 (1972). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
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and the Constitution than it does between the judiciary and 
statutes or regulations, regardless of the practical similarities 
among the tasks of interpreting each kind of text. 
Thus, it becomes apparent—from constitutional 
structure, constitutional text, the Court’s own jurisprudence, 
and scholarship—that Courts have the authority to hear 
constitutional claims against the government, even without 
congressional approval.  In fact, as discussed above, the Court 
itself articulates this right.  But somehow, when it articulates 
the sovereign immunity doctrine, it ignores this reality and 
instead credits Congress with exclusive waiver power. 
B. Sharing the Power 
The time has come for the Court to remedy its sovereign 
immunity rhetoric and, to some extent, its practice.  While 
the Court may still look to Congress for the waiver authority 
in cases involving alleged statutory violations by or common 
law suits against the government, the Court should no longer 
spin the fiction that Congress is vested with the sole waiver 
authority.  Rather, the Court should acknowledge its own 
inalienable power to waive immunity in cases in which 
plaintiffs have sued the federal government for constitutional 
violations.  Importantly, the Court need not use its waiver 
authority in every case involving an alleged constitutional 
violation by the government.  As Fallon and Meltzer argue, to 
serve as a meaningful constitutional check, the Court need 
only enforce general constitutional compliance, so the 
branches are on notice and are prepared for the possibility of 
judicial review: “[T]o keep the government generally within 
constitution bounds . . . does not depend on the provision of 
any single remedy, retroactive or prospective, but instead on 
the system of constitutional remedies as a whole.”124  While 
selective waiver by the Court might prevent it from 
remedying every constitutional violation by the federal 
government,125
 
 124. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 101, at 1795. 
 selective waiver would allow the Court to 
weigh the factors that currently inform congressional waiver 
decisions—balancing the costs to the public of allowing 
litigation to proceed (e.g., court costs, attorneys’ fees, docket 
 125. This would underserve the first of the “two basic functions” of 
constitutional remedies, as described by Fallon and Meltzer: “to redress 
individual violations.”  Id. at 1777. 
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load, the costs—either financial or effort—of any court-
imposed remedies) with the costs to the plaintiff of preventing 
remedy to alleged injury.  To that end, because the Court 
could make its waiver determinations on a case-by-case basis 
more effectively than Congress can, it might better be able to 
determine which cases are effective vehicles for monitoring 
government behavior and which are unnecessary or 
inadvisable to hear. 
One might ask: But can the Court just up and change its 
sovereign immunity jurisprudence willy-nilly?  Especially 
after almost two hundred years with this established legal 
doctrine?  Although reasonable sounding, these questions 
misunderstand both the nature of the Court’s relationship to 
the sovereign immunity doctrine and what changes a two-way 
sharing of the sovereign immunity would entail. 
While it is true the Court had a primary role in the 
development of the sovereign immunity doctrine (as discussed 
in Part I), it is an overstatement to say that the Court created 
the doctrine.  It is better to say the Court enunciated the 
doctrine.  Because broad federal sovereign immunity is not an 
artifact of the Constitution, it is best justified as a 
background principle upon which the Constitution was 
formed.  Constitutional background principles are by 
definition not explicit in the text of the Constitution; rather, 
they are unwritten tenets that, we assume, the Founders 
meant to inform our reading of the Constitution.  
Importantly, we rely upon the Supreme Court to articulate 
constitutional background principles.126
 
 126. See, e.g., McCreary County, Kentucky v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of 
Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (articulating the principle of religious neutrality 
as underlying the First Amendment based, in part, on intentions of “[t]he 
Framers and the citizens of their time”); Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 
539 (1976) (finding that the Framers did not intend for either the First or Sixth 
Amendments to be assigned priority over the other, despite the foreseeable 
tensions between freedom of the press and right to an impartial jury, and 
resolving the case upon that background principle). 
  Although the 
historical documents and logic the Court relies upon to suss 
out these principles are available to everyone, the Court is 
the one to enunciate—and fix—an authoritative account of 
the Founders’ shared assumptions.  When the Court must 
interpret the Constitution for a case before it, the Court may 
find that, although not codified, a pre-constitutional principle 
remains in force.  In these cases, we may disagree with the 
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Court’s articulation of that principle, but we would be foolish 
to ignore the Court’s reliance upon the principle. 
Federal sovereign immunity is one such background 
principle.  The Court has never located a constitutional 
provision for the doctrine.  Instead, when it reaffirms the 
doctrine (as it has done repeatedly127), it cites only to its own 
precedent, which chains back to United States v. Lee and its 
reliance upon the early Court’s (misguided) adoption of a 
doctrine “derived from the laws and practices of our English 
ancestors.”128
But the Supreme Court’s role as background principle 
articulator does not allow the Court free rein to create any 
background principles it chooses.  Rather, any Court-
enunciated doctrine must comport with the Constitution, 
even if it comprises an underlay to the Constitution itself.  An 
interpretive canon asserts that where a text contradicts the 
background on which that text was drafted, the express 
language of the text supersedes.
  This reliance upon pre-constitutional history 
without a corresponding constitutional cite is strong evidence 
that the Court considers federal sovereign immunity an 
unwritten principle upon which the Founders agreed. 
129
 
 127. See, e.g., United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287 (2009); FDIC v. 
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994); United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980); 
United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (citing United States v. 
Thompson, 98 U.S. 486; United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196; Kan. v. United 
States, 204 U.S. 331; Minn. v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 387; Keifer & Keifer 
v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 388; United States v. Shaw 309 U.S. 
495). 
  Accordingly, only 
textually consonant aspects of the underlay remain.  Applying 
this canon to constitutional interpretation, it strains credulity 
to believe that the Constitution’s express terms would not 
take precedence over pre-constitutional implied terms.  To 
accept anything else would be to wrest the Constitution from 
 128. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 205 (1882).  For an example of 
the Court’s citation chain back to Lee, see, e.g., United States v. Dep’t of Energy 
v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992) (“[A]ny waiver of the National Government’s 
sovereign immunity must be unequivocal, see United States v. Mitchell.”); 
United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) (“It is elementary that ‘[t]he 
United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued 
 . . . . United States v. Sherwood.’ ” ); United States v. Sherwood, 312, U.S. 584, 
586 (1941) (citing United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196) (“The United States, as 
sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued . . . .”). 
 129. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976); cf. Hassan 
v. Colorado, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1198–99 (D. Colo. 2012), aff'd, 495 F. App’x 
947 (10th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2769, 186 L. Ed. 2d 218 (U.S. 2013). 
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its most obvious meanings. 
If this is true—that pre-constitutional background 
principles must necessarily be constitutionally consonant—
then the Court’s current iteration of the federal sovereign 
immunity doctrine is unconstitutional, regardless of what the 
Court has said in the past.  The current doctrine purports to 
vest in Congress exclusive waiver authority.  That is, the 
Supreme Court has said that the Founders intended that 
Congress alone could decide whether the federal 
government’s actions could be subject to judicial review at the 
hand of the populace in all cases, at all times, no matter what 
the alleged injury or purported crime.  No matter if the 
alleged grievance is a constitutional one.  This version of the 
doctrine is unconstitutional because it violates the checks and 
balances embedded in the Constitution. 
The Court not only can, but it must revise its articulation 
of federal sovereign immunity if the doctrine’s current form 
does not comply with the Constitution.  The nature of 
discerning background principles is such that the Court may 
easily revise its previous understanding, with little more than 
a discussion of the evidence for its error and the correction.  
In articulating this provision of the doctrine of federal 
sovereign immunity waiver—that the Court retains waiver 
authority over cases involving claims of constitutional 
violations (what this Article calls “Court constitutional 
waiver”)—the Court would not be creating a new doctrine; 
rather, it would be ameliorating the doctrine, finally and at 
long last bringing it into constitutional compliance. 
III. THREE-DIMENSIONAL IMMUNITY: WAIVER FOR ALL 
BRANCHES 
Recognizing that the sovereign immunity waiver power is 
necessarily shared by two of the federal branches—the 
legislative and the judiciary—raises the question: Why not 
the executive?  A previously unconsidered but strong case 
exists for a waiver power that is shared by each branch of the 
federal government.  In such a regime, each branch would 
hold a part of the waiver authority, subject to the roles and 
limitations imposed upon that branch by the Constitution’s 
separation of powers.  This Part develops this triply-shared 
power and argues that it is this conception of sovereign 
immunity that is the most constitutionally consonant of all. 
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A. A Proxy-Sovereign Government 
The argument that each branch of government shares in 
the federal immunity waiver authority begins with a 
recognition that, in the United States, it is the people—and 
not the government—who are sovereign.  If one takes 
seriously the Federalist view that the Constitution 
contemplates sovereignty residing in the people,130 then the 
federal government to which the Constitution gives form is 
merely a proxy—a holder and exerciser of derivative 
authority, subject to the constraints placed upon it by the 
authorizing sovereign.131  Viewed in this way, the 
Constitution is a contract, designed to codify the terms on 
which the proxy sovereign will act in the place of the 
sovereign.132
 
 130. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 454 (1793) (Wilson, J.) 
 
To the Constitution of the United States the term SOVEREIGN, is 
totally unknown. There is but one place where it could have been used 
with propriety. But, even in that place it would not, perhaps, have 
comported with the delicacy of those, who ordained and established 
that Constitution. They might have announced themselves 
‘SOVEREIGN’ people of the United States: But serenely conscious of 
the fact, they avoided the ostentatious declaration. 
Id.; 10 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 128 (1800) (remarks of Sen. Pinckney) (“I suppose 
it will hardly yet be denied, that the people are the common fountain of 
authority to both the Federal and State Governments. . . .”); see also 
Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at,1214 (citing approvingly to Amar’s argument 
that “the first words of the Constitution, ‘We the People,’ . . . make the people 
sovereign”); Amar, supra note 1, at 1439 (arguing that the sovereignty of the 
people “informs every article of the Federalist Constitution” and that it is “no 
happenstance that the Federalists chose to introduce their work with words 
that ringingly proclaimed the primacy of that new understanding: ‘We the 
people of the United States . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for the 
United States of America’” ); id. at 1451–53 (“Nationalists and states’ rightists 
could offer complementary—indeed, virtually identical—accounts of how the 
sovereignty of the People enabled the Constitution to empower yet limit federal 
officers, to impose restrictions on state governments, and to separate and divide 
power within the federal government. On such questions, it did not much 
matter which People were sovereign, but only that ‘the People’ were and that 
governments were not.”). 
 131. A. Benjamin Spencer has explained the Framers’ approach to this proxy 
sovereign “assignment” of powers: “The Framers first had to agree on what 
powers the national government as a whole would have and then they had to 
decide to which department to assign such powers.” A. Benjamin Spencer, The 
Judicial Power and the Inferior Federal Courts: Exploring the Constitutional 
Vesting Thesis, 46 GA. L. REV. 1, 35 (2011).  He further argued that because 
“[a]chieving this balance was a tricky matter,” and because of “what rested on 
these decisions,”“one is obligated to honor the decisions made and take seriously 
the allocations of power on which the Framers settled.” Id.  
 132. The proxy-sovereign framework advocates an approach similar in 
BRINTON FINAL 5/23/201412:39 PM 
2014] SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 267 
The sovereignty arrangement formed by the Constitution 
is complicated.  First, the Constitution assumes that the 
people will exercise their sovereignty through two levels of 
government—federal and state—which itself raises difficult 
questions of federalism, state rights, and the nature of dual 
sovereignty.133  As Justice Kennedy has written: “The 
Framers split the atom of sovereignty. . . . Constitution 
created a legal system unprecedented in form and design, 
establishing two orders of government, each with its own 
direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual 
rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are 
governed by it.”134
As discussed more fully below, Articles I, II, and III 
identify powers and limitations on each federal branch, which 
those branches are without power (and authorization) to 
unilaterally—or collectively—change.
  In addition to cutting the sovereign powers 
between state and federal governments, the Constitution 
divides the sovereign proxy powers at the federal level.  For 
purposes of federal sovereign immunity, only the second cut 
matters: the assignment of the sovereign’s national powers to 
three branches, each branch exercising primary responsibility 
for one of three national sovereign authorities. 
135
 
general, if not in detail, to Martin H. Redish and Elizabeth J. Cisar’s “pragmatic 
formalism.”  See Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were to 
Govern”: The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 
DUKE L.J. 449, 454 (1991).  As Redish and Cisar describe it, to determine the 
“constitutional validity of a particular branch action, from the perspective of 
separation of powers,” a court should resort “solely [to] the use of a definitional 
analysis” by “determining whether the challenged branch action falls within the 
definition of that branch’s constitutionally derived powers-executive, legislative, 
or judicial.”  Id.  Like Redish and Cisar’s “pragmatic formalism,” the proxy-
sovereign framework points to the constitutional account of separation of 
powers as a basis for determining what federal actions are constitutionally 
consonant. See also Odette Lienau, Who is the “Sovereign” in Sovereign Debt?: 
Reinterpreting a Rule-of-Law Framework from the Early Twentieth Century, 33 
YALE J. INT’L L. 63, 76–77 (2008) (“Jean-Jacques Rousseau is perhaps the 
paradigmatic early political theorist in this vein, arguing that legitimate 
government must be grounded in a ‘social contract’ in which the force of the 
government or prince is merely the public force concentrated in him. As soon as 
he wants to derive from himself some absolute and independent act, the bond 
that links everything together begins to come loose.”) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted). 
  The only way for the 
 133. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity As A Doctrine of Personal 
Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1559, 1581–82 (2002). 
 134. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring). 
 135. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 3 (requiring that all federal officials—
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formal reordering or revision of this tripartite system of 
government is through the constitutional amendment 
process, which requires the approval of the sovereign people 
(either acting directly or through their state-elected 
representatives).136  Thus, the Constitution makes clear that, 
despite the potency of the powers delegated to the federal 
branches, those powers are limited, and they must be 
exercised on behalf and with the approval of the people.  As 
the Court wrote in Loving v. United States, “By allocating 
specific powers and responsibilities to a branch fitted to the 
task, the Framers created a National Government that is 
both effective and accountable.”137
This understanding of the proxy relationship between the 
federal government and the people comprises what this 
Article calls “the proxy-sovereign framework”—that is, a 
framework by which the constitutionally prescribed 
relationships and roles of the sovereign people and its proxy 
sovereigns (the federal branches) can resolve questions about 
the limits and contours of federal branch behavior.  The 
proxy-sovereign framework allows a closer inspection of the 
so-called sovereign conduct of the federal government than 
current scholarship affords.  Rather than allowing the United 
States to act domestically as a sovereign without limits, the 
proxy-sovereign framework requires that each expression of 
sovereign privilege by a branch of the federal government be 
supported by the specific terms upon which that branch was 
charged with exercising the people’s sovereignty. 
 
As applied to sovereign immunity, the proxy-sovereign 
framework reveals that the Constitution requires a triply-
shared waiver authority.  It does so through a logical 
syllogism: If waiving sovereign immunity is the prerogative of 
the sovereign, then that prerogative runs with sovereignty.  
In a system with proxy partial sovereigns, some part of 
sovereign waiver prerogative runs with the proxy sovereign 
powers allocated to each branch, unless the waiver power has 
been exclusively consigned to one branch. Because the 
Constitution does not allocate the waiver power to one 
particular branch, each branch retains its portion of the 
 
legislative, executive, and judicial—must be “bound by Oath or Affirmation, to 
support this Constitution”). 
 136. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 137. 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996). 
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waiver power that is consonant with that branch’s proxy 
sovereignty.  Congress retains the waiver power as 
expressible by a legislature, cabined and shaped by Article I; 
the President retains the waiver power as expressible by 
Article II’s terms on the executive; and the judiciary retains 
the waiver power as expressible by Article III courts.  This 
argument and its implications will be briefly discussed below. 
B. Congress and the Waiver Power 
Understanding how Congress can properly exercise its 
federal sovereign immunity waiver power first requires an 
understanding of Congress’s constitutional role as a proxy 
sovereign.  What the sovereign people tasked Congress with 
doing—and what they prohibited Congress from doing—
defines what situations and via what processes Congress is 
authorized to waive sovereign immunity on behalf of the 
sovereign.  Ultimately, this discussion should support a 
central claim of this Article: while the Constitution allows 
Congress broad authority to waive sovereign immunity via 
legislation, as Congress has done, the sovereign people have 
not vested exclusive waiver authority in Congress.  While this 
claim does not disturb current congressional waiver practice, 
it should fundamentally alter our rhetoric about federal 
immunity waiver and give permission for the other federal 
branches to exercise their proxy waiver powers. 
1. Congress’s Constitutional Role 
Although the debate about the proper role of Congress 
began well before Congress did,138 the Constitution reveals, 
and most contemporary scholars agree, that Congress’s 
constitutional role constitutes at least the following: (1) it is a 
policy-making body with (2) majoritarian representation and 
(3) enumerated (specific but arguably limited) powers.139
 
 138. See, e.g., Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, in 5 ELLIOTT’S 
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 139, 286, 317 (2d. ed. 1986). 
  
 139. See, e.g., Krent, supra note 84, at 1533 (discussing the applicability of 
Congress’ role as a policy-making body with majoritarian representation to 
federal sovereign immunity); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The 
Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 
1153, 1176 (1992) (discussing Congress’s constitutional power and noting that 
Congress’ “legislative powers are limited to the specifically enumerated powers 
‘herein granted’ by the Constitution”). 
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Each of these facets of congressional identity has implications 
for Congress’s ability to waive sovereign immunity; 
accordingly, it is valuable to review them at least briefly. 
The Constitution ordained Congress to be a policy-
making body.  By virtue of Article I, Congress is the branch 
tasked with originating and authorizing national laws.  
Congress’s policy choices are not subject to much second-
guessing by the other branches.140  With the exception of the 
presidential veto—which itself can be overcome by 
congressional override—and judicial review for 
unconstitutionality, a law Congress passes will remain law 
until a subsequent congressional majority changes policy 
direction and votes otherwise.  The Constitution vests in 
Congress the responsibility for making mostly unreviewable 
choices to effect the ends they choose by the means they 
choose.  Whether the term “legislative powers” itself 
comprises the discretionary nature of this rulemaking 
authority is an issue hotly contested by scholars,141 but that 
debate needn’t be resolved for purposes of this article.  Here it 
is sufficient to argue that, at least as to the enumerated 
powers in Article I, Section 8, Congress alone retains the 
authority to make policy choices as a first actor.142
 
 140. This is true insofar as constitutional text is concerned.  In practice, the 
President can issue signing statements that indicate his disapproval of the 
legislation he is signing; he can direct executive agencies to refrain from 
implementing the laws created by Congress; and he can use his bully pulpit to 
speak out against congressional policy.  Courts can, of course, find statutes 
unconstitutional.  But, as discussed above, as a matter of constitutional text, 
when Congress makes policy decisions, the other branches are limited in their 
abilities to legally undo congressional policymaking. 
  This 
 141. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the 
Nondelegation Doctrine’s Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1297, 1308 (2003); Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From 
Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2115 (2004); 
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Nondelegation: A Post-Mortem, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1331, 1332–33 (2003); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1728 (2002).  
 142. Ascribing an exact denotation to the “legislative power” that is unique to 
Congress as among the federal branches and consonant with the text of the 
Constitution is difficult. As others have noted, even “historical evidence shows 
that ‘legislative power’ was not a term of art that was used in a single way.”  
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 141, at 1342.  The central tenet of my effort 
here is that when Congress makes choices within constitutional limits, which 
choices become law that bind the nation, the only critique other branches or the 
populace can levy against Congress is that it used its discretion poorly, not that 
it used it unlawfully. 
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means that Congress can weigh public sentiment, costs and 
benefits, constitutional or other values, or even caprice and 
whim, to initiate domestic rules in certain areas, without 
much concern for the toes of other branches.143
Congress’s responsibility to make national policy is 
coupled with its constitutional responsibility—or burden—of 
being responsive to the national polity.
 
144  The primary 
mechanism for this responsiveness is the manner of 
representative selection and removal, identified in Article I, 
Sections 2 through 5 (and, in 1913, the Seventeenth 
Amendment).  This feature of congressional representation 
has been discussed in detail elsewhere,145
Charged with the task of national policymaking and 
chosen by local popular elections, Congress can only exercise 
certain powers.  The nature of congressional power—its force 
as well as its scope—is defined by Article I, most importantly 
Section 8. Two points about Congress’s Article I powers are 
necessary here.  First, most scholars interpret Article I, 
Section 8 as giving Congress the “power of the fisc,” by which 
they mean plenary control over the federal government’s 
money.
 but the effects of 
this fairly direct responsiveness to the people cannot be 
overstated.  Because the Constitution tasked Congress with 
effecting the will of the people and subjected individual 
representatives to regular constituent reelections, it seems 
fair to say that the Framers established Congress as the most 




 143. See U.S CONST. art. I, § 8. 
  Congress’s bundle of financial powers is identified 
 144. See, e.g., David Schoenbrod, Politics and the Principle That Elected 
Legislators Should Make the Laws, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 239, 240 (2003) 
(“This Constitution required legislators to take responsibility not only for tax 
laws, but all other laws regulating the people, as well as all laws appropriating 
their money.”). 
 145. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Rights and Votes, 121 YALE L.J. 1286, 1293 
(2012); Spencer Overton, The Participation Interest, 100 GEO. L.J. 1259, 1260 
(2012); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. 
REV. 29, 29 (1985).  
 146. See, e.g., Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 
725 (2012); Figley & Tidmarsh, supra note 93, at 1252 (“First, the Convention 
never had in mind that the right of appropriation could be exercised by any 
branch other than the legislature.”); Todd David Peterson, Protecting the 
Appropriations Power: Why Congress Should Care About Settlements at the 
Department of Justice, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV. 327, 329 (2009) (in particular, see 
string cites at footnote 17); Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE 
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in Section 8; it includes the power to tax, borrow money, pay 
debts, coin money, and prosecute counterfeiting.147  If the very 
structure of the Constitution and its scheme of separation of 
powers does not make clear that the power of the purse is 
exclusively congressional, Section 9 itself imposes this 
limitation: “No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but 
in consequence of appropriations made by law.”148  Although 
some dispute the reality of this sole control,149 there is strong 
support that the Framers intended Congress to have plenary 
control over the federal government’s expenditures.150
A second point about Congress’s enumerated authority: 
nothing in Article I, which details all congressional authority, 




2. Congress’s Waiver Power 
  If Article I included a clause like the 
following—“The power to allow suit in law or equity against 
the United States and its officials”—this article would be very 
different.  But it does not.  Nor do any of the enumerated 
powers clearly comprise a waiver authority.  The 
repercussions of this will be discussed further below, but the 
point is necessary to make here as part of our discussion of 
Congress’s constitutional role.  This lack of express authority 
matters.  Article I’s first words—”[a]ll legislative powers 
herein granted”—coupled with the Tenth Amendment 
prohibit grafting onto Congress legislative powers not given it 
by Article I.  If the Framers intentionally vested Congress 
with sole control over federal immunity waiver, then the 
waiver authority must be found within a provision of Article 
I.  Because it is not, then either Congress does not possess the 
authority, or Congress shares it with other organelles under 
some other theory. 
At least these features of Congress’s constitutional role—
its role as policymaker, its responsiveness to popular will, and 
its limited but meaningful bundle of powers—have important 
 
L.J. 1343, 1344 (1988). 
 147. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 148. U.S. CONST. art. I, at § 9, cl. 7; see Stith, supra note 146, at 1349–1350. 
 149. HAROLD J. KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 77–83 (2005).  
 150. See, e.g., Figley & Tidmarsh, supra note 93, at 1263. 
 151. Cf. id. at 1252 (arguing that the appropriations power implies exclusive 
congressional authority over waivers of federal sovereign immunity in cases for 
damages against the United States). 
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implications for our understanding of immunity waiver.  Let’s 
remember: when understood in context of the proxy-sovereign 
framework, Congress is the federal organelle charged with 
exercising one part of the people’s sovereign powers: in 
particular, a subset of the people’s sovereign legislative 
powers.152
With this backdrop, the three features of Congress’s 
constitutional role discussed above largely support current 
congressional waiver practice.  As noted earlier, Congress has 
exercised its authority to allow waiver of immunity in a 
variety of contexts. In each case, it did so after engaging in 
policy discussions informed by its political responsiveness.  
The FTCA is a notable example. Public outcry about the 
military plane crash into the Empire State Building prompted 
Congress to finally retract the federal government’s immunity 
to tort suit, which it had been debating for more than twenty 
years.
  Therefore, if the authority to waive sovereign 
immunity is a feature of sovereignty, then insofar as Congress 
is expressing the people’s sovereignty, it can exercise a 
concomitant power of sovereign immunity waiver. 
153  The public outcry even prompted Congress to 
retroactively date the law, to allow some claims (including the 
plane crash) that had already occurred.  Subsequent revisions 
to the FTCA were enacted after further political discussion, 
including a sharp response to a 1988 Supreme Court opinion 
interpreting the law to allow more individual official liability 
than Congress felt was appropriate.154  These legislative acts 
were an entirely appropriate expression of Congress’s waiver 
authority.  As a matter of sovereignty, the people charged 
Congress with using its derivative legislative authority to 
enact legislation responsive to the public will.  And, within 
constitutional constraints (via legislation, by duly elected 
representatives, not in violation of any substantive 
constitutional limitations), Congress did so.155
 
 152. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. X (providing that the remainder of the 
peoples’ sovereign legislative powers is “reserved to the states respectively, or to 
the people.”). 
 
 153. See DANIEL A. MORRIS, FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS § 1:10 (2012). 
 154. See id., § 7:4; Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292 (1988). 
 155. In neither the FTCA nor the legislative documents issued 
contemporaneously with the first version does Congress articulate with which 
enumerated power it was enacting the law.  This is no surprise—Congress 
routinely does not root its acts expressly in provisions of the Constitution—but I 
would argue that within most interpretations of the enumerated powers, the 
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The caveat: nothing about Congress’s constitutional 
role—or its enumerated powers—restricts the waiver 
authority to Congress.  Although a waiver of immunity can 
take the form of legislation, it need not (as will be discussed 
later).  And nothing in Article I expressly allocates to 
Congress the authority to waive immunity.  Even Krent’s 
article justifying congressional waiver of federal immunity in 
cases of tort and contract156 does not exclude the possibility 
that the waiver authority might be held simultaneously—
although differently—by Congress and the other two 
branches.  Certainly his analysis does not foreclose the 
possibility, as he justifies congressional waiver on grounds of 
institutional competency and policy rather than on 
constitutional text.157  Even better, his article invites the 
possibility: first, by noting the role that courts play in 
protecting constitutional boundaries and rights158; second, by 
noting that the executive, like Congress, exercises “some of 
th[e] responsibility” to “formulate . . . national policy”159; and 
third, by noting that Congress monitors Congress, “[j]udges 
judge judges,” and “the executive branch enforces the law 
with respect to its own officers.”160
C. The Judiciary and the Waiver Power 
 
Like Congress, the judiciary’s sovereign role affects how 
it can express its portion of proxy-sovereign power.  But 
unlike Congress, the judiciary’s role is not so clearly 
enumerated, at least not in the Constitution.161
 
FTCA is appropriate, as part of its powers to pay debts, provide for the general 
welfare, to make rules for the government, or to make laws that are necessary 
and proper.  In any case, it was an uncontroversial expression of congressional 
authority.  
  Rather, the 
Court’s role has unfolded over time, as the Court and the 
 156. See generally Krent, supra note 84. 
 157. Id. at 1533. 
 158. Id. at 1535. 
 159. Id. at 1537. 
 160. Id. at 1538. 
 161. “The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme 
Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 
and establish.”  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also Craig A. Stern, What’s a 
Constitution Among Friends?—Unbalancing Article III, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1043, 
1043 (1998) (“Nine out of ten experts agree that a straightforward reading of the 
first section of the third article of the United States Constitution does not 
work.”). 
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other branches have operationalized the strictures imposed 
by the Constitution.162
1. The Judiciary’s Constitutional Role 
  The Court now wields a few powers 
that are widely accepted in practice and, for the most part, in 
scholarship.  This role justifies some ways in which the Court 
currently waives governmental immunity, and it explains 
what the Court does not—why those waivers are proper 
demonstrations of the Court’s constitutionally allocated 
proxy-sovereign power. 
Academics have identified a host of court powers that 
might be part of the Court’s irreducible minimum of “judicial 
power.”  Teasing through these proposals is beyond the scope 
of this article.163  One power of the Court is its role as final 
constitutional arbiter, which is discussed in detail above.164
A second relevant power set is also within the Court’s 
arsenal—the Court’s equitable powers to manage the cases 
before it.  As part of its proxy-sovereign power to decide 
“cases” and “controversies,”
  
The argument that the Court’s constitutional role gives rise to 
and shapes its sovereign immunity waiver authority is also 
made above, so it will not be repeated here. 
165
 
 162. See, e.g., Evan Caminker, Allocating the Judicial Power in a “Unified 
Judiciary”, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1513, 1518 (2000) (“Of course, to say that the 
Vesting Clause devolves upon Article III courts a ‘nebulous grant[ ] of power’ is 
somewhat of an understatement; one must certainly go beyond that sparse 
phrase to discover the power’s specific attributes.”) (quoting Calabresi & 
Rhodes, supra note 139, at 1195.). 
 the Court actively uses its 
equitable powers—in particular, those that allow courts to 
manage the cases brought before them—in accordance with 
traditions of fairness or equity.  These equitable powers are 
relevant to the Court’s role as a sovereign immunity waiverer 
because, as will be discussed later, they justify the Court’s 
use of its waiver power when doing so would serve the Court’s 
 163. See, e.g., Alex Glashausser, The Extension Clause and the Supreme 
Court’s Jurisdictional Independence, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1225 (2012); Spencer, 
supra note 131; Tara L. Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal 
Jurisdiction, 124 HARV. L. REV. 869 (2011); Stern, supra note 161; Calabresi & 
Rhodes, supra note 139; Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article 
III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569 (1990); Akhil R. Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the 
Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 443 (1989); 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and 
Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915 (1988);  
 164. See supra Part II.A. 
 165. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
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duty to manage cases equitably. 
To understand the way this waiver might work, it is first 
necessary to understand the justification for the Court’s 
having equitable case management powers.  In Hecht Co. v. 
Bowles166, the Court explained its use of broad equitable 
powers, notwithstanding a statute that appeared to require 
the Court to impose a specific remedy.167
The Court’s defense in Hecht of its equitable powers is 
more than an articulation of its (and the lower courts’) 
continued reliance upon those powers; it is an exposition of 
the justification for that reliance and of the powers’ defining 
nature.  In Hecht, the Court relied upon “several hundred 
years of history” to justify and regulate “equity practice,”
 
168 
suggesting that the Court does not consider the Constitution 
to have swept clean its equitable authority.  Rather, the 
Court insisted it retained powers that were definitionally 
broad: “The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power 
 . . . to do equity and to mould [sic] each decree to the 
necessities of the particular case.”169
The Court’s decision in Hecht suggests however, a 
possible limitation on those equitable powers.  The Court did 
not assert that Congress is unable to modify the judiciary’s 
use of equity practice.  Rather, it found that, in that case, 
Congress did not sufficiently articulate its intent to alter the 
equitable scheme.  This fact-specific holding left open the 
possibility that, with enough chutzpah and clarity, Congress 
could successfully amend or affect the Court’s reliance on 
equity.  Though only implied in Hecht, this possibility for 
amendment has found expression in subsequent Court 
cases.
  In these ways, Hecht 




 166. 321 U.S. 321 (1944). 
  It is now clear that when Congress wants to alter 
the Court’s use of equity powers, it can do so.  But it must do 
so clearly and unequivocally, lest an intransigent Court find 
reason to resist. 
 167. Id. at 329–30 (citation omitted). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See, e.g., United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 540 (1996) (finding that 
a statutory codification of “principles of equitable subordination” allowed a court 
to make exceptions but not to generally reorder legislatively chosen priorities). 
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Congress’s efforts to revoke or cabin the judiciary’s equity 
practice have targeted some equity powers more than others.  
Equitable causes of action and remedies are often preempted 
by or explicitly incorporated into federal statutory schemes171; 
federal courts’ efforts to assert these powers without 
statutory authorization are met with controversy and some 
disfavor by reviewing courts.172  But another set of equitable 
powers—what I call “case management powers,” such as 
equitable tolling, waiver of affirmative defenses, waiver of 
claims, etc.—are fairly standard, are generally accepted, and, 
in some cases, are codified in court rules.173  Like all equitable 
powers, these case management powers are affectable by 
Congress,174 but I would argue that they are the ones least 
likely to be so, at least under past and current practice.  It is 
not entirely apparent why the case management powers 
should be met with more favor than other equitable powers.  
Perhaps it is due to a commonly shared sense that strong 
fairness values underlie the use of these tools, or to 
Congress’s relative inattention to legislatively modifying or 
prohibiting them.  Whatever the reason, these equitable 
powers are, at present, the safest for the Court to exercise 
and are at the zenith of the Court’s equitable powers.175
 
 171. I would argue that when an equitable power is codified legislatively, 
there is a strong argument that it loses its equitable nature and becomes 
statutory, even if Congress has expressly incorporated the traditions underlying 
the use of that equitable power. 
 
 172. See, e.g., Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 
527 U.S. 308, 332–33 (1999) (holding that the courts do not possess the 
equitable authority to “create remedies previously unknown to equity 
jurisprudence” and commenting that “debate concerning this formidable 
[remedy] . . . should be conducted and resolved where such issues belong in our 
democracy: in the Congress”). 
 173. See, e.g., Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 50 (2002) (“It is hornbook 
law that limitations periods are customarily subject to equitable tolling.” 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); FED. R. CIV. P. 13 (2011) 
(requiring parties to plead affirmative defenses in response to a pleading). 
 174. See, e.g., Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990) 
(“We therefore hold that the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling 
applicable to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits against 
the United States.  Congress, of course, may provide otherwise if it wishes to do 
so.”). 
 175. For instance, in Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, Congress had 
enacted a statute of limitations, which the Court construed to be a limitation on 
Congress’s waiver of sovereign immunity.  Notwithstanding this 
acknowledgment that Congress had specified timing requirements, that those 
timing requirements were jurisdictional (as part of the waiver of sovereign 
immunity), and that interpreting those timing requirements would require the 
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Traditionally, the Court has used its powers to equitably 
manage cases to provide for some kinds of judicial fair play.  
If a party has been unable to file its case within the 
appropriate statute of limitations—because, for instance, a 
timely-filed pleading was actually defective or because “the 
complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary’s 
misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass”176—
federal courts have sometimes found justice to be served by 
tolling the statute of limitations, allowing suit to proceed 
after the statutorily prescribed deadline.177  If the defendant 
has failed to raise claims or affirmative defenses in a timely 
manner, though those claims and defenses be valid, federal 
courts routinely find that those claims and defenses are 
waived, even if they would have merited redress or prohibited 
suit, respectively.178  Courts have reasoned that withholding 
consideration of late but otherwise valid claims or that 
keeping a defendant in a case, despite late but otherwise 
dispositive defenses, is fair, in that doing so incentivizes 
parties to act in ways that economize costs and provide fair 
play for all parties and the courts.179
 
Court to interpret them narrowly in accordance with the Court’s sovereign 
immunity interpretive canon, the Court found that its equitable powers 
triggered tolling.  The Court justified its ruling this way: “[W]e think that 
making the rule of equitable tolling applicable to suits against the Government, 
in the same way that it is applicable to private suits, amounts to little, if any, 
broadening of the congressional waiver. . . . Congress, of course, may provide 
otherwise if it wishes to do so.”  Id. at 95–96.  Compare this easygoing tone to 
the strict tone adopted by the Court in Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. 
Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., in which the Court was addressing the equitable 
power to craft a novel judicial remedy: “Even when sitting as a court in equity, 
we have no authority to craft a ‘nuclear weapon’ of the law like the one 
advocated here [a kind of preliminary injunction]. . . . The debate concerning 
this formidable power over debtors should be conducted and resolved where 
such issues belong in our democracy: in the Congress.”  527 U.S. 308, 332–33 
(1999). 
  In these ways, federal 
courts routinely use their equitable powers to serve their 
constitutional responsibility to act as proxy for the people’s 
 176. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96. 
 177. See, e.g., id. 
 178. See, e.g., Boddy v. Dean, 821 F.2d 346, 350 (6th Cir. 1987); Martinez v. 
Orr, 738 F.2d 1107 (10th Cir. 1984); Milam v. United States Postal Service, 674 
F.2d 860 (11th Cir. 1982); Saltz v. Lehman, 672 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 179. See, e.g., Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982) 
(“By holding compliance with the filing period to be . . . a requirement subject to 
waiver as well as tolling when equity so requires, we honor the remedial 
purpose of the legislation as a whole without negating the particular purpose of 
the filing requirement, to give prompt notice to the employer.”). 
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sovereign power to finally resolve disputes, a unique role 
facilitated by the court’s unique powers. 
2. The Judiciary’s Waiver Power 
The Court’s constitutional roles as final constitutional 
arbiter and equitable case manager define how it may 
appropriately use its sovereign immunity waiver power.  One 
application of this waiver authority has implicitly been 
recognized by the Court, but more are available. 
The primary way in which the Court has embraced its 
waiver authority relates to its use of equitable powers to 
allow apparently statutorily-barred suits against the 
government to nevertheless proceed.  For instance, in the 
past, the Court has found its inherent equitable powers allow 
it to toll statutes of limitations that otherwise have precluded 
suit.  As the Court stated in Irwin v. Department of Veterans 
Affairs: “Once Congress has made such a waiver [of 
immunity], we think that making the rule of equitable tolling 
applicable to suits against the Government, in the same way 
that it is applicable to private suits, amounts to little, if any, 
broadening of the congressional waiver.”180
As noted above, the first thing the Court could (and 
should) do differently in a proxy-sovereign-framework era is 
to accurately describe the doctrines it has equivocally created.  
  The Court’s 
“little, if any, broadening of . . . waiver” language is perhaps 
an equivocal way of indicating that, regardless of practical 
effect, the Court deemed itself justified in applying its 
equitable tolling practices to sovereign immunity waivers.  
And per the proxy-sovereign framework, it is.  If applying 
traditional principles of tolling allows the Court to manage its 
cases in a way that serves equity, consonant with its 
constitutional role of adjudicating cases and controversies, 
then it has the proxy-sovereign authority to do so.  This 
analysis lends credence to the Court’s practice of making 
available some federal accountability in situations that have 
previously defied a coherent legal justification.  But this 
discussion also raises questions about what the Court could 
be doing that it is not.  For, in its efforts to sustain the legal 
fiction of exclusive congressional waiver, it has left 
unharnessed powers it could well exercise. 
 
 180. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95–96. 
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But the Court has open to it more than a change in rhetoric.  
At least one concrete changes must follow: the Court could 
consider sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense, as is 
done at the state level, rather than as a jurisdictional bar, as 
is the current federal practice.  The current practice of 
treating sovereign immunity waiver as a component of 
jurisdiction defies both sense and statutory construction.  In 
accordance with its equitable powers, the Court should 
change this jurisdictional practice. 
The Court’s current approach to sovereign immunity—
that it is jurisdictional, rather than an affirmative defense—
exposes an inconsistency in the Court’s jurisprudence.  In 
theory, academics agree that Article III courts may only hear 
a case against a federal defendant if the plaintiff has a cause 
of action, the court has jurisdiction, and Congress has waived 
sovereign immunity.  In practice, however, sovereign 
immunity has not been treated as an independent 
requirement; rather, sovereign immunity is treated as a 
component of the jurisdictional requirement.  As Professor 
Vicki Jackson has argued, “What we call the ‘sovereign 
immunity’ of the United States in many respects could be 
described as a particularized elaboration of Congress’ control 
over the lower court’s jurisdiction.”181  As a result, courts 
must raise the question of sovereign immunity even if the 
parties fail to raise it. 182
This view of sovereign immunity waiver—that it is a 
defining part of federal court jurisdiction and is only 
congressionally controlled—does not make much sense.  First, 
it is not entirely clear in what sense sovereign immunity 
waiver is “jurisdictional.”  Jackson’s argument suggests that 




 181. Jackson, supra note 81, at 521. 
  But, if this 
is true, then 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which grants district courts 
subject matter jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under 
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,” 
would seem to have already granted district courts all the 
original jurisdiction they need to hear claims against federal 
defendants brought under the Constitution or federal laws.  
Separate waivers of sovereign immunity would seem not to be 
 182. See SISK, supra note 11, §1.05. 
 183. Jackson, supra note 81, at 570–71. 
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necessary, at least not as a jurisdictional matter. 
Second, treating waivers as jurisdictional does not 
comport with the federal judiciary’s expressed ability to shape 
waiver in constitutional cases.  In these cases, the courts 
assert jurisdiction regardless of a lack of congressional 
waiver.184
Third—and perhaps most interestingly—treating federal 
sovereign immunity waiver as strictly jurisdictional diverges 
from state sovereign immunity practice.
 
185  State sovereign 
immunity is often classified, in both state and federal 
courts,186 as an affirmative defense.187  It is waivable by the 
defendant, according to equitable principles, and it need not 
be considered by the court sua sponte.188
 
 184. See supra Part II.A. 
  This state treatment 
of sovereign immunity waiver allows cases to be resolved with 
a greater degree of equity and deprives the government 
defendant from unfair gamesmanship.  For instance, in 
 185. For a thorough and thoughtful discussion of why state sovereign 
immunity is best understood as being nonjurisdictional, see Scott Dodson, 
Mandatory Rules, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1, 18 (2008).  
 186. Caleb Nelson has offered an explanation for federal court treatment of 
state sovereignty as an affirmative defense. It centers on the Article III “Case” 
or “Controversy” requirement: “[M]any members of the Founding generation 
thought that a ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’ did not exist unless both sides either 
voluntarily appeared or could be hailed by the court. . . .  Under background 
rules of general law, a state could not be compelled to answer an individual’s 
complaint.  But if the state voluntarily appeared and submitted its dispute with 
the plaintiff to the court, it created a ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’ and subjected itself 
to the federal government’s judicial power.”  Caleb Nelson, supra note 133, at 
1565–66. 
 187. Federal circuit courts have themselves split on how they treat this issue. 
See 13 RICHARD D. FREER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 3524.1 (3d ed. 2013) (identifying the Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and 
Eleventh Circuits has courts that require “the immunity question, like one of 
Article III jurisdiction, [to] be resolved before addressing the merits;” the First, 
Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits as courts that have concluded 
“they are not required to address [sovereign immunity] before proceeding to the 
merits;” and the Second and Sixth Circuits have mixed law on the issue). 
 188. Notably, federal courts are allowed but not required to raise the issue of 
state sovereign immunity sua sponte. See, e.g., id. (“The Court has sent 
conflicting signals on the nature of the sovereign immunity defense. In some 
ways, it has treated the defense as jurisdictional and in others it has not. It is 
aware of this fact, and has forthrightly recognized that it has not definitively 
resolved the question.”); Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of State of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 
515 (1982) (“[B]ecause of the importance of state law in analyzing Eleventh 
Amendment questions and because the State may, under certain circumstances, 
waive this defense, we have never held that it is jurisdictional in the sense that 
it must be raised and decided by this Court on its own motion.”).  
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United States ex rel. Burlbaw v. Orenduff,189 upon appeal, the 
State defendant asserted their sovereign immunity 
conditionally.  The State did not assert sovereign immunity 
at the district court level, and it won on the merits.  When the 
plaintiff appealed, the State filed a brief requesting a review 
of the merits, while noting that the State would only assert 
its immunity if the court “reverse[d] the district court’s 
merits-related decision.”  Because state sovereign immunity 
is an affirmative defense and not a jurisdictional one, the 
court had the power to decide whether the State had properly 
raised the sovereign immunity defense, rather than needing 
to resolve the sovereign immunity issue at the appeals 
stage.190
To resolve these conflicts and to bring federal waiver 
practice into accord with a better understanding of each 
branch’s constitutional role and powers, federal courts should 
treat federal sovereign immunity waiver as an affirmative 
defense.
 
191  At present, sovereign immunity waiver has been 
promoted to a jurisdictional issue without reasons that 
survive an analysis of sovereign immunity under the proxy-
sovereign framework.192
 
 189. 548 F.3d 931 (10th Cir. 2008). 
  If Congress does not have exclusive 
 190. The court affirmed the district court on the merits, thereby preempting 
the need to decide whether the State was properly defended by sovereign 
immunity.  Id. at 960. 
 191. Arguably, Congress could write sovereign immunity into its 
jurisdictional constraints on the lower courts, but it has not.  Although, I should 
point out that it is possible that article III precludes even this stripping of 
jurisdiction, since section 2 gives to the Supreme Court the authority to hear 
“controversies to which the United States shall be a party” and then later either 
gives the Supreme Court original jurisdiction of these cases (as ones “affecting 
 . . . public ministers and consuls”) or appellate jurisdiction, which would imply 
that some lower court would need jurisdiction to hear “controversies to which 
the United States shall be a party” as a first matter.  Admittedly this 
interpretation of article III is itself controversial, but it has a plausible textual 
basis upon which the Court could rely. 
 192. The Supreme Court and most federal circuit courts treat federal 
sovereign immunity as a jurisdictional issue. See SISK, supra note 11, § 6.08 
(Supp. 2012).  But, as the Seventh Circuit illustrates, they need not. The 
Seventh Circuit has adopted the position that sovereign immunity is not a 
jurisdictional issue. See, e.g., United States v. County of Cook, Ill., 167 F.3d 381, 
388–89 (7th Cir. 1999) (“For most purposes it overstates the strength of 
sovereign immunity to analogize it to a lack of jurisdiction.”).  Writing for the 
circuit, Judge Easterbrook explained that sovereign immunity must not be 
treated as jurisdictional because doing so would allow the United States to have 
“as many bites at the apple as it finds necessary, until it has prevailed or 
exhausted all available lines of argument,” since “every statute authorizing the 
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control over waiver, then Congress’s silence on sovereign 
immunity does not equate to a presumption of no waiver that 
can be interpreted as part of its jurisdictional grants to lower 
Article III courts.  Instead, Congress’s silence on waiver 
should trigger a look to the other federal branches, to see if 
they have waived immunity.  And, insofar as the Court holds 
the equitable power to require parties to proceed when they 
have not adequately raised their affirmative defenses, the 
Court likewise holds the power to require a federal defendant 
to proceed, when it has not raised to the Court its immunity 
from suit.193  Such a waiver of sovereign immunity is 
consonant with the Court’s equitable case management 
powers, which it wields on behalf of the sovereign people who, 
without a constitutional court apparatus, would retain the 
rights to operate courts in equity and exercise those courts’ 
inherent equitable authority.194
Cases in which courts have found state sovereign 
immunity defenses to have been waived are instructive.  
These give clues as to what kinds of behaviors from a federal 
defendant could prompt a court to exercise its equitable case 
management powers to waive immunity for a federal 
defendant that has not properly raised its immunity defense. 
 
 
courts to adjudicate claims to property or funds of the United States is a waiver 
of sovereign immunity, and every argument that the United States makes (or 
omits) in defense is in the end an argument about sovereign immunity.”  Id. at 
385–86 (emphasis in original). 
 193. Cf. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133 
(2008) (describing limitations on the Court’s power to exercise its equitable 
authority in the face of particular kinds of congressional waiver). But at least 
one scholar has noted that John R. Sand & Gravel Co. is an aberration from the 
Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence.  See Sisk, supra note 4, at 606, 
(although the author believes the Court’s primary error in the case is in 
interpreting a statute of limitations differently for the government than it 
would for a private party). 
 194. Perhaps a clarification about “waiver” is needed here.  We talk about 
affirmative defenses being “waived” by defendants who do not raise them 
sufficiently or in time.  We likewise use the term “waive” to mean the 
government’s withdrawal of its shield of sovereign immunity.  Here, I am 
arguing that where a federal defendant does not adequately raise its shield of 
sovereign immunity—thereby, incurring unnecessary costs to the plaintiff and 
the court and working hardship or inequity—that defendant may have “waived” 
an affirmative defense.  But sovereign immunity is not itself “waived” until the 
Court finds that the defendant’s failure to raise the defense merits the use of 
the Court’s equitable power to pierce the shield of immunity and “waive” (for 
lack of a better word) immunity on behalf of the government party.  See United 
States v. County of Cook, Ill., 167 F.3d 381, 387 (7th Cir. 1999) (“It is the 
judgment of the court, and not of the attorneys, that has legal effect.”).  
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Delay is a common reason for waiver.195  For instance, the 
Supreme Court of South Carolina found that sovereign 
immunity did not protect a defendant who waited to raise the 
defense until appeal; in so doing, the Court even rejected the 
contention that such a delay need result in “plain error” to 
cause waiver.196  Mere failure to plead was sufficient.197  
Likewise, Texas has established that where a governmental 
defendant “waited until after the case was tried to a verdict 
before asserting governmental immunity in a motion for 
judgment n.o.v.,” the defendant was “not entitled to avoid 
liability on the ground of governmental immunity.”198  The 
Texas Supreme Court reasoned that this waiver was required 
by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which require that 
parties plead affirmatively any avoidances or defenses so as 
to “put openly in issue on the trial of a case all of the reasons, 
in fact and in law, why the other party should not prevail.”199
Other jurisdictions predicate their finding of an 
immunity defense waiver on traditional prejudice 
considerations.  Recently, the Alaska Supreme Court held 
that whether the state defendant had waived immunity 
required an analysis of whether “the adverse party is 
prejudiced by the moving party’s delay in raising the 
defense.”
 
200  The Court noted that while the trial court had 
properly considered the state’s ten-year delay in raising the 
defense, the trial court had not properly decided whether that 
delay itself prejudiced the plaintiff, or if the litigation had in 
fact been extended by “bankruptcy proceedings and several 
appeals.”201  The Court remanded for trial court consideration 
of all the factors relevant to any “prejudicial effect of the 
State’s delay in raising the defense.”202
 
 195. See, e.g., Washington v. Whitaker, 451 S.E.2d 894, 898 (1994). 
  Similarly, a New 
Jersey court found that where a governmental defendant had 
not specifically pled its immunity defense until more than two 
 196. Washington v. Whitaker, 451 S.E.2d 894, 898 (1994). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Davis v. City of San Antonio, 752 S.W.2d 518, 519 (Tex. 1988). 
 199. Id. (citation omitted); see also Gauvin v. City of New Haven, 445 A.2d 1, 
3 (1982) (finding that sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense, requiring 
affirmative pleading, in order “to apprise the court and the opposing party of the 
issues to be tried and to prevent concealment of the issues until the trial is 
underway”) (citing Pawlinski v. Allstate Ins. Co., 327 A.2d 583, 586 (1973). 
 200. Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v. State, 215 P.3d 333, 340 (Alaska 2009). 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 341. 
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years after the plaintiff filed her complaint, during which 
time the defendant sought complete discovery and otherwise 
fully participated in litigation, a sovereign immunity defense 
had been waived.203  The court found that allowing the 
defense at this stage “would work injustice to another who, 
having the right to do so, has detrimentally relied” on the 
defendant’s implicit waiver.204
These cases illustrate two relevant points: (1) the 
treatment of sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense is 
a practice well within the power and expertise of courts, 
already accustomed to making case management 
determinations of equity and justice; and (2) allowing 
sovereign immunity to be a defense waivable by courts 
according to equitable considerations does not mean the gate 
to governmental liability will be thrown wide open.  Federal 
courts are, like state courts, capable of making these 
equitable determinations, and state courts have shown 
themselves restrained in granting these equitable waivers.
 
205  
There is no reason to expect that federal courts will grant 
waivers more broadly than states do, particularly in light of 
congressional power to legislate the federal courts’ powers 
away, if, for instance, courts grant equitable waivers too 
loosely.  It would be reasonable to expect that, in some cases, 
federal courts will be confronted, as state courts have been, 
with bad government defendant behavior.206
 
 203. Hill v. Bd. of Educ. of Middletown Twp., 443 A.2d 225, 228 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1982). 
  Like state 
courts, federal courts should be equipped to respond to case 
misconduct within its role as proxy-sovereign case manager, 
even if the offending party is the federal government.  Courts 
should assert their equitable case management powers to 
treat federal sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense.  
Nothing but a misunderstanding of sovereign powers 
prevents them from doing so, and such a move would be in 
line with the Court’s slow drift toward finding that 
 204. Id. 
 205. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. City of Chicago, 492 N.E.2d 1292, 1294–95 (Ill. 
1986) (finding immunity defense under state tort law waivable but not waived 
where pleaded—albeit imperfectly—in answer to complaint). 
 206. See, e.g., John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133 
(2008) (at the trial level, federal government conceded the timeliness of certain 
plaintiff claims and then won on the merits; amicus brief raised the issue on 
appeal and the Court found claims barred by untimeliness). 
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“procedural rules . . . are to be applied in the same manner 
[against federal government defendants] as among private 
parties, with no special solicitude for the government.”207
D. The Executive and the Waiver Power 
 
As Congress and the Court are partial proxy sovereigns, 
the Executive too serves as a partial proxy sovereign for the 
American people because, according to the Constitution, it 
wields one part of the people’s sovereign powers (i.e., the 
Executive power).  The Executive’s proxy sovereignty is 
created by and detailed in Article II, which vests in the 
President “[t]he executive power” and specifies the 
President’s constitutional roles.208  By identifying the 
President as a partial proxy sovereign, Article II grants the 
President (and the agencies he directs) a part of the sovereign 
waiver authority currently being exercised by Congress and 
the Court.  But also like Congress and the Court, the 
President is constrained by his proxy sovereignty to exercise 
the sovereign waiver power in accord with his constitutional 
roles and powers.209
1. The Executive’s Constitutional Role 
 
Article II is misty at best about what exactly the 
“executive power” entails.210  Some have argued that the 
specific roles and tasks prescribed by Article II are the sum 
total of the President’s “executive power.”211
 
 207. Sisk, supra note 4, at 522. 
  Others have 
 208. U.S. CONST. art. II. 
 209. Id. 
 210. See also KRENT, supra note 149, at I (“Understanding presidential 
powers from a constitutional perspective is . . . difficult. There is no readily 
definable list of attributes or authorities. Article II itself is quite vague, never 
defining the ‘executive’ power with specificity.”). 
 211. See, e.g., id. at 12 (quoting PACIFICUS NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton); id. at 
I (“The discrete powers granted to the president, such as the authority to enter 
into treaties, serve as commander in chief, and appoint superior officers, do not 
define the precise contours of what presidents can or should do. . . . [M]ost are of 
the view that the constitutional language presents only a starting point that 
must be complemented by considerations of the overall structure of the 
Constitution, the underlying purposes of those who drafted Article II and 
ratified the Constitution, and historical practice.”); Calabresi & Rhodes, supra 
note 139, at 1177–78 (“[T]he status of the Vesting Clause of Article II as a 
substantive grant of power is hotly debated. . . . The non-unitarians read [the 
Article II Vesting Clause] as substantively meaningless because of the specific 
enumeration of presidential powers in Article II, Section 2.”). 
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argued that the “executive power” comprises more than the 
Article II articulations, with the outer limits of the executive 
power undefined by the Constitution itself.212  Resolving the 
merits of these arguments is beyond the scope of this Article.  
It is sufficient to accept the following about the President’s 
constitutional roles: (1) he has a constitutional obligation to 
“preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United 
States”213; (2) he has a constitutional responsibility and the 
authority to “take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed”214; (3) he leads subordinate organelles within the 
executive branch215; and (4) he is elected in a way more 
responsive to popular will than to congressional control.216
 
 212. See, e.g., Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 139, at 1177–78 (“The 
unitarians construe it as an affirmative grant of power to supervise and control 
all subordinate officials ‘executing’ existing constitutional and statutory 
provisions.”). 
  
Whether these responsibilities and powers are within the 
“executive power” or outside of it, it is clear that these are 
within the President’s constitutional domain and they are 
only so because he was chosen by the sovereign people to 
exercise these sovereign powers in their stead. 
 213. U.S. CONST. art II, § 1. 
 214. U.S. CONST. art II, § 3. 
 215. See U.S. CONST. art II, § 2 (“[The President] may require the opinion, in 
writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments. . . .  [H]e 
shall nominate . . . [and] appoint . . . all other officers of the United States, 
whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be 
established by law.”); see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American 
Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787-1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 
1270–71, 1275 (2006) (“Hence, the mere fact that the heads of departments 
would be appointed by the President, that Congress itself had no appointing 
power for administrative officials under the Constitution, and that ‘heads of 
Departments’ in the Appointments Clause seemed to presume single-headed 
administrative entities, would suggest to any proponent of the new 
Constitution’s executive arrangements a colossal improvement over the years of 
the Confederacy. There would indeed be a unitary ‘executive’ but what that 
meant for the organization of ‘administration’ remained to be determined.”).  Cf. 
KRENT, supra note 149, at 20–23 (exploring the argument that “[a] strong 
conception of a unitary executive . . . runs afoul of historical precedent and 
Congress’s discretion under Article I to provide for what it determines is the 
best mechanism, consistent with other constitutional restraints, of 
implementing congressional directives,” in particular, Congress’s authority to 
delegate specific executive responsibilities to particular agency officials, rather 
than the to the President). 
 216. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XII; Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. 
Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1385, 1391 (2008) (“One of 
the obvious defining features of the US Presidency is the national electoral 
constituency.”). 
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In practice, these presidential responsibilities, 
authorities, and roles are relevant to federal sovereign 
immunity practice in the following ways.  Congress has 
created executive departments, which are under the 
President’s control.217  Each department218 is governed by an 
organic statute, which is Congress’s charge to the agency.  
The President and his executive officers are required to lead 
the agencies in accord with the Constitution and with the 
congressional laws they were created to execute.  Thus, via 
these agencies, the President fulfills his constitutional 
responsibility to “take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed. . . .”219
Importantly, an agency and its officials cannot lawfully 
act outside of Congress’s statutory charge to them.
 
220  To do so 
would be to act ultra vires; these actions consistently get 
struck down by the Court for being impermissible.221  Also 
significantly, an agency and its officials cannot lawfully act 
contrary to statute.222
 
 217. This is arguably true, even for independent executive agencies, over 
which the President does not have direct appointment or removal powers.  See 
Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers 
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 583 (1984) (“All agencies, 
whether denominated executive or independent, have relationships with the 
President in which he is neither dominant nor powerless. They are all subject to 
presidential direction in significant aspects of their functioning, and able to 
resist presidential direction in others (generally concerning substantive 
decisions).”); KRENT, supra note 149, at 49 (“Although presidents can shape the 
exercise of power by heads of ‘executive’ agencies far more than ‘independent’ 
agencies, they can attempt to influence the exercise of delegated authority by all 
agency heads.”). 
  Again, doing so would be ultra vires 
 218. With the possible exception of the military, which was constitutionally 
ordained.  See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8; U.S. CONST. art II, § 2. 
 219. U.S. CONST., art. II,§ 3. 
 220. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 
(1952) (Jackson, J. concurring) (explaining that the President’s power flows and 
ebbs with congressional authorization and disapproval, respectively). 
 221. See, e.g., Akram v. Holder, 721 F.3d 853, 864 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding 
that the immigration regulation in question is ultra vires insofar as it requires 
that certain immigration petitioners adjust status only by way of a relationship 
to the petitioning citizen, a requirement not supported by statute); EME Homer 
City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“Absent a claim of 
constitutional authority (and there is none here), executive agencies may 
exercise only the authority conferred by statute, and agencies may not 
transgress statutory limits on that authority. Here, EPA’s Transport Rule 
exceeds the agency’s statutory authority in two independent respects.”). 
 222. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2012) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . 
in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory 
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and, moreover, would be a forsaking of the executive 
responsibility to faithfully execute the laws.  But, within 
congressional and constitutional bounds, agencies are often 
able to act with wide latitude and discretion.  Organic 
statutes are notoriously vague, appearing to give agencies 
broad authority to create regulations and take action, even 
though technically confined within a particular congressional 
purview.223  In practice, agencies act as quasi-policymaking 
bodies, which can regulate broadly with little review.224  
Despite some private efforts to have this policymaking 
declared unconstitutional, the Court has long upheld the 
executive’s authority to regulate in accordance with 
congressionally issued “intelligible principle[s].”225
 
right.”).  See, e.g., City of Arlington, Tex. v. Fed. Comm. Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 
1863 (2013) (“[F]or agencies charged with administering congressional 
statutes,”“[b]oth their power to act and how they are to act is authoritatively 
prescribed by Congress, so that when they act improperly, no less than when 
they act beyond their jurisdiction, what they do is ultra vires.”). 
  In 
addition to rulemaking, which is a major part of executive 
efforts to faithfully execute the laws, agencies act via 
investigations, licensing, sanctions, adjudications, grants, and 
other orders.  They justify these actions as being necessary 
for fulfillment of their congressional and constitutional 
 223. E.g., Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 47 
U.S.C. § 151 (2006)) (“For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign 
commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as 
possible, to all the people of the United States, without discrimination on the 
basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex, a rapid, efficient, Nation-
wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate 
facilities at reasonable charges, for the purpose of the national defense, for the 
purpose of promoting safety of life and property through the use of wire and 
radio communications, and for the purpose of securing a more effective 
execution of this policy by centralizing authority heretofore granted by law to 
several agencies and by granting additional authority with respect to interstate 
and foreign commerce in wire and radio communication, there is created a 
commission to be known as the ‘Federal Communications Commission’, which 
shall be constituted as hereinafter provided, and which shall execute and 
enforce the provisions of this chapter.”).  Vague statutes such as these give rise 
to scholars’ concerns about the nondelegation doctrine, which some believe to be 
the constitutional requirement that Congress—and not agencies—make the 
laws that bind citizens. 
 224. Agency regulations are generally open to public challenge in the courts 
via the Administrative Procedure Act.  See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2012).  But 
insofar as legal challenges are merely efforts to second-guess agency 
policymaking, rather than to allege procedural violations or truly ultra vires 
actions, they are largely unsuccessful. 
 225. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928). 
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obligations.226
 2. The Executive’s Waiver Power 
 
The President’s proxy-sovereign power to execute the 
laws created by Congress shapes his proxy-sovereign power to 
waive immunity.  Once Congress has created a law and 
delegated it to an agency for execution, that agency can use 
all its powers (congressionally crafted or constitutionally 
inherent in the executive) to fulfill its faithful execution 
obligations.227  As Professor Henry Monaghan has explained, 
“[U]nlike the legislature, administrative agencies can never 
pretend to an unlimited power to select among goals; the 
universe of each agency is limited by the legislative 
specifications contained in its organic act.”228
Although Congress may prescribe the laws that the 
executive must execute, it is the Constitution that imposes 
upon the executive the obligation to faithfully execute the 
law.  Accordingly, if an agency determines that to faithfully 
execute the law sovereign immunity should be waived, then, 
as part of the executive, it can exercise the President’s proxy-
sovereign authority to do so.
 
229  It must, however, act within 
the following constraint: an executive agency cannot waive 
immunity where Congress has expressly retained federal 
sovereign immunity.  This constraint is a constitutional one.  
For the executive to waive immunity in contradiction to a 
congressional directive would be a violation of the executive’s 
obligation to faithfully execute the law.230
 
 226. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2011). 
  Therefore, if 
 227. See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14 (1983). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Or the President himself could direct the agencies via executive order to 
adopt regulations waiving sovereign immunity where Congress has not 
otherwise done so.  See KRENT, supra note 149, at 57 (“[P]residents enjoy the 
discretion under Article II—at least in the absence of congressional indication to 
the contrary—to mold the rulemaking of executive agencies as long as agency 
heads retain the formal right to issue the final rule.”). 
 230. I acknowledge that this point is arguable.  The Constitution may 
identify some areas of control in which the President can act, regardless of 
contradictory congressional mandate: e.g., direction of the military, some 
aspects of foreign relations, appointment of officers, etc.  But I’d argue that his 
actions in these areas would not be in furtherance of his constitutional 
obligation to faithfully execute the law but in furtherance of his other 
constitutional obligations, so he is not bound to congressional will in the same 
way. And too, if we take a Justice Jackson Youngstownian approach, the 
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Congress has enacted statutes that explicitly raise the shield 
of immunity, then the executive cannot act to lower that 
shield.  For example, because the Flood Control Act of 1928 
expressly dictates that “[n]o liability of any kind shall attach 
to or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by 
floods or flood waters at any place,”231 the executive could not 
act to waive sovereign immunity in the Katrina litigation,232 
even if the President or his administrators had wanted to.233
Understanding that the executive can waive immunity as 
part of its larger efforts to faithfully execute the law 
illuminates the forms that executive waiver can take.  Like 
other executive efforts to implement statute, agencies can 
waive immunity to execute statutes through (1) rulemaking 
and (2) other agency action.  This means that an agency can 
promulgate a regulation through its regular means—subject 
to the procedural constraints of the Administrative Procedure 




President may not be without power to act in contradiction to congressional 
approval; his authority may just be at its lowest ebb.  See Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952). 
  This 
would allow agencies to do more than adopt regulations 
waiving immunity for suits.  Insofar as executive agencies 
currently claim that congressional failure to waive sovereign 
immunity limits them from adopting regulations that would 
allow settlement of cases, payment of interest and back pay, 
etc. (see discussion above), they would no longer be so limited.  
Rather, they could adopt these regulations if they, by 
exercising their proxy-sovereign authority to waive sovereign 
 231. Flood Control Act of 1928, 33 U.S.C. § 702c (“No liability of any kind 
shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods 
or flood waters at any place . . . .”). 
 232. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation (Katrina Levees), 533 F. Supp. 
2d 615, 643 (E.D. La. 2008) (finding that sovereign immunity prevented suit 
against the federal government for injuries related to the levee failures during 
Hurricane Katrina). 
 233. President Obama may have considered waiving immunity in the 
Katrina litigation had the option been open to him. At an October 2009 meeting 
with New Orleans residents to discuss the government’s participation in the 
Katrina clean-up, President Obama is reported to have said, “[W]e are working 
as hard as we can, as quickly as we can,” and then added, “I wish I could just 
write a check.”  To which someone called out, “Why not?”  President Obama 
responded, “There’s this whole thing about the Constitution.” Peter Baker & 
Campbell Robertson, Obama Meets Critics in New Orleans, NY TIMES (Oct. 15, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/16/us/politics/16obama.html. 
 234. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq (2012). 
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immunity, deem such regulations would allow them to 
faithfully execute the law. 
In addition to acting by regulation, it seems likely that 
executive agencies could act to waive immunity on a case-by-
case basis.  Their authority to do this stems from one of two 
sources: (1) judicial authority to waive immunity for equitable 
purposes, or (2) the agency’s own authority to act instantially.  
The first source of the authority is really the flip-side of the 
court’s authority to waive immunity for case management 
purposes.  If an agency or federal official is sued and chooses 
to respond without raising the defense of sovereign immunity, 
then, as discussed above, the Court could choose to require 
the federal defendant to participate in the suit, even without 
another applicable legislative, regulatory, or judicial waiver.  
This of course puts the ultimate decision about waiver in the 
hands of the Court, but at least it suggests one way in which 
an agency could choose to act to increase the likelihood of its 
being subject to suit. 
The second source of an agency’s authority to waive 
immunity on an ad hoc basis is its administrative power to 
decide between acting by rulemaking or by adjudication.235  
Current administrative law principles hold that agencies 
have largely unreviewable authority to decide whether to act 
by promulgating regulations—that is, by issuing broad-based, 
law-type rules that bind those to whom they apply—or by 
acting ad hoc—i.e., issuing orders, imposing sanctions, 
deciding individual cases, etc.236  Agency authority to act in 
this ad hoc way is not clean or uncontroversial, but it is fairly 
well established.237
 
 235. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (“[T]he 
choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc 
litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the 
administrative agency.”). 
  Courts are very unlikely to reprimand an 
agency that has acted without having first established a 
regulation that would inform the public as to the direction of 
 236. Id. at 202 (“Not every principle essential to the effective administration 
of a statute can or should be cast immediately into the mold of a general rule. 
Some principles must await their own development, while others must be 
adjusted to meet particular, unforeseeable situations. In performing its 
important functions in these respects, therefore, an administrative agency must 
be equipped to act either by general rule or by individual order.”). 
 237. LAWSON, supra note 11, at 364–68 (noting that the Chenery II holding 
“remains a bedrock principle of federal administrative law—though . . . it 
displays a few fault lines”). 
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and purpose behind that agency action.238  If an agency 
wanted to respond to suit in a given case, it could likely do so, 
even without a regulation expressly waiving immunity.  The 
court would likely allow the case to proceed, unless doing so 
would violate a contrary regulation or statute.239
Understanding that the executive can act to waive 
immunity means that the President and his agencies are no 
longer prevented by congressional silence from authorizing 
suits against federal agencies or federal officials.
 
240  Some 
may wonder why an agency would want to authorize suits 
against it or its officials.  For good reasons, agencies may 
choose to not exercise their waiver powers in most 
circumstances.  But politics itself may present the executive 
with occasions in which it wants to open itself to potential 
liability and court review.241
 
 238. Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 202–03 (“[P]roblems may arise in a case which 
the administrative agency could not reasonably foresee, problems which must 
be solved despite the absence of a relevant general rule. . . . In those situations, 
the agency must retain power to deal with the problems on a case-by-case basis 
if the administrative process is to be effective.”). 
  A presidential administration 
may want to allow suit for actions taken or regulations 
instituted by a previous administration.  Or it may want to 
compensate the injured for political good will: to be seen as 
fair, benevolent, or publicly responsive.  Less cynically, a 
sense of justice itself might prompt an agency to waive 
immunity for its own actions, as might a realization (either 
internally or special-interest-group driven) that allowing 
citizen suits could be a real mechanism for checking agency 
behavior, during the current administration or in the future. 
 239. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C). 
 240. Notably, at this time, any judgment rendered against an administrative 
agency would be recoverable.  As discussed below, because of the Judgment 
Fund, see infra note 246, any damage judgments issued against an 
administrative agency would be payable without further congressional 
authorization. Of course, in cases for declaratory or injunctive relief, the 
executive does not need congressional authorization to comply with court 
judgments against it.  
 241. Others have recognized that politics might motivate agency 
participation in granting monetary settlements against an agency, as 
authorized in some cases by the Judgment Fund.  See Peterson, supra note 146, 
at 331 (“[W]hen the Department defends cases brought against the federal 
government, it may wish to compensate plaintiffs for political reasons or 
because the administration favors the plaintiff’s cause, even though the 
plaintiff’s legal claim is weak.”). 
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E. The Problem of the Purse 
There is one important caveat: money.  As discussed 
above, Congress has plenary authority over federal money.242
First of all, the Court can limit its court-created 
constitutional waivers to cases in which plaintiffs sue 
individual federal officials; in these cases, seeking payment of 
money judgments would proceed as they would in typical civil 
cases.
  
Therefore, absent legislation authorizing the payment of 
money damages in suits against the government, the Court 
has no way to make Congress pay damages. This is true, even 
in cases for governmental wrongs.  This concern is less 
important than it seems at first glance.  As a first matter, the 
issue of payment is one that regularly plagues plaintiffs 
seeking damages.  In most civil suits, when plaintiffs 
awarded damages, they must then proceed to try to collect.  
Courts do not usually withhold judgment or otherwise 
prevent suit, merely because they foresee that plaintiffs are 
unlikely to get payment.  They allow suit to proceed 
regardless, issue a judgment, and, if the plaintiffs are 
successful, allow the plaintiffs to seek payment according to 
law.  While some have argued that federal defendants are 
different, I would argue that they are not. 
243  But second, should the Court decide to create a 
constitutional cause of action for money damages against the 
United States itself (or one of its organelles, rather than one 
of its officers), a successful plaintiff is not categorically barred 
from receiving payment.  Like plaintiffs in typical civil suits, 
a victorious plaintiff in such a case has a legal method to seek 
payment—merely the method differs.  With a money 
judgment in hand, he or she can petition Congress to 
authorize the payment of that judgment via a special bill or 
some relevant general legislation.  This may not be easy, 
sure—but money collection rarely is.  And Congress may 
sometimes be willing to pay.244
 
 242. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7; see Figley & Tidmarsh, supra note 93. 
  The possibility that a 
 243. Notably, executive agencies often indemnify individual officials in these 
suits. Whether they do this is a policy decision, up to the particular agency; 
whether they have money to pay for it is similarly a question for the agency and 
its congressional authorization.  The Court need not be concerned with the 
existence of these arrangements, but it might validly consider them as part of 
its weighing of the benefits or costs of creating a constitutional legal remedy 
against individual federal officials.  
 244. Consider Congress’s efforts to retroactively take responsibility for the 
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defendant may not make good on a judgment should not 
prevent a plaintiff from obtaining that judgment.245
As a second matter, Congress has already statutorily 
authorized the payment of money damages against federal 
government defendants.
 
246  Not since the middle of the 
twentieth century has Congress been required to appropriate 
funds for every individual claim made payable against the 
government.247  In 1956, Congress enacted the Judgment 
Fund Act, creating a fund allowing for the payment from the 
Treasury for most damage awards issued against the federal 
government.248  The fund was created without monetary limit 
and without the need for recurring appropriations.249  Soon, 
Congress amended the act to allow for payment out of the 
Judgment Fund for settlements in “actual or imminent” 
litigation.250  And in 1977, Congress eliminated the previous 
cap of $100,000 payment per judgment.251  The Judgment 
Fund still exists today, as an essentially limitless, pre-
authorized appropriation for the payment of money damages 
awarded in federal court or otherwise authorized by the 
Department of Justice for settlement.252
 
military plane crash into the Empire State Building.  See supra Part I.B 
(discussion of the passage of the FTCA).  Congress created a law—a broad, 
liability-inviting, tort reform law—in response to public sentiment that the 
government should pay for some of its tortious actions.  It is possible to imagine 
Congress again being willing to curry public favor by fulfilling a court-imposed 
obligation to pay damages for an executive action the judiciary has found faulty.  
Authorizing a payment on a politically popular court judgment may make 
Congress look like the hero. 
  The Judgment Fund, 
 245. Addressing the question of unenforceability in a similar context 
(whether unenforceability renders a judgment against the United States an 
advisory opinion and therefore impermissible), Judge Easterbrook wrote in 
United States v. County of Cook, Ill., “Although the raw power of Congress to 
withhold appropriations means that a given judgment requiring the United 
States to pay money may be unenforceable, this remote possibility does not 
render all judgments advisory.”  167 F.3d 381, 386 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 246. 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (2012). 
 247. See Act of July 27, 1956, ch. 13, 70 Stat. 694 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 
1304); Peterson, supra note 146, at 349; Lowell E. Baier, Reforming the Equal 
Access to Justice Act, 38 J. LEGIS. 1, 9 (2012). 
 248. 31 U.S.C. § 1304. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Act of Aug. 30, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-187, 75 Stat. 415–16 (1961) (codified 
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2414 (2006)); Peterson, supra note 146, at 349; Baier, 
supra note 247, at 9. 
 251. Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-26, § 101, 91 
Stat. 61, 96; Peterson, supra note 146, at 349. 
 252. 31 U.S.C. § 1304; see 31 C.F.R. § 256.1 (2012) (“The Judgment Fund is a 
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therefore, represents Congress’s acquiescence to payment of 
money damages from the Treasury in cases against the 
federal government.  Congress could, of course, repeal the 
Judgment Fund Act, but so far, it has shown no interest in 
doing so.  Until then, however, the Court should not worry 
about ordering the government to pay money damages in 
cases.253  Legally, the awards can be honored, via the 
processes established by the Financial Management Service, 
the arm of the U.S. Treasury tasked with administering the 
legislatively created Judgment Fund.254
CONCLUSION 
 
Sovereign immunity as a defense against government 
liability is notoriously unpopular.  It is one of the rare legal 
doctrines that draw outrage (rather than mere ambivalence 
or apathy) from the public.  As the recent Hurricane Katrina 
litigation reminded us, when members of the public are 
denied redress for governmental grievances on the sole basis 
 
permanent, indefinite appropriation which is available to pay many judicially 
and administratively ordered monetary awards against the United States. In 
addition, amounts owed under compromise agreements negotiated by the U.S. 
Department of Justice in settlement of claims arising under actual or imminent 
litigation are normally paid from the Judgment Fund, if a judgment on the 
merits would be payable from the Judgment Fund.”).  See also The Judgment 
Fund: Common Questions, FIN. MGMT. SERV., https://www.fms.treas.gov/ 
judgefund/questions.html.  The mass appropriation of Judgment Fund money is 
consistent with Congress’s practice of “granting lump sum appropriations” due 
to Congress’s inability to “foresee every particular expenditure necessary.”  
KRENT, supra note 149, at 78.  
 253. Some might argue that a resort to petitioning of the legislative process 
would transform the court’s judgment into an advisory opinion. I see the 
reasoning behind such an argument—without legal authority to formally fix 
repayment, the Court is merely issuing position statements on situations it 
cannot meaningfully redress—but I think it oversimplifies the difficult 
questions raised by redressability, and it misapprehends the current legal 
landscape. As discussed above, Congress has already authorized payment of 
most money damages against the government and a simplified, streamlined 
process for requesting payment exists.  See 31 C.F.R. § 256. For the time being, 
this should largely settle the matter.  But second, individuals will always be 
able to petition for private relief; Congress might well be more inclined to honor 
the payment demands of individuals who have won a judgment in a court, after 
the vetting inherent in a formalized fact-finding, claim resolution process. While 
this may be a less direct form of redress, it is not necessarily the kind of 
unredressability that should preclude Article III courts from hearing these 
claims as “cases” or “controversies.” 
 254. See id.  The Judgment Fund: Common Questions, FIN. MGMT. SERV., 
https://www.fms.treas.gov/judgefund/. 
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of federal sovereign immunity, the public response is not 
positive.  Scholars, too, criticize the doctrine, arguing for its 
demise on the grounds that it is undemocratic, illogical, and 
unfair.  Perhaps this widespread negative sentiment could be 
ameliorated if people felt the doctrine (a) allowed more access 
to government liability, and (b) operated in a way that more 
clearly and rationally served the interests of the true 
sovereign, rather than the interests of self-interested, lazy, or 
ineffectual congressmen. 
A two-dimensional version of the waiver power, in which 
Congress and the Court share authority to waive immunity, 
is constitutionally mandatory.  It is time for the Court to 
recognize the critical role it does and should play in checking 
the constitutional behavior of the other branches.  But a 
three-dimensional form of the waiver power is also 
constitutionally possible. 
Either of these multi-dimensional understandings of the 
waiver power would not necessitate an expansion of waiver, 
but they certainly make it more possible.  And individuals 
seeking redress or a chance for redress for government 
grievances would have more opportunities to persuade federal 
authorities to waive immunity in the ways they can.  At 
present, the only way to meaningfully seek waiver where 
there is none is to lobby Congress to adopt legislation to that 
end—an expensive and herculean task, one not well suited to 
the needs of the small populations likely to be hurt by any 
particular act of government wrongdoing.  But acknowledging 
that each branch has its own access to waiver, subject to its 
constitutionally imposed sovereign limitations, would allow 
the injured the opportunity to petition Congress, agencies, 
and courts to consider lowering the shield of sovereignty in 
the ways the branches can.  The aggrieved may not receive 
the redress or opportunity for suit they desire, but at least 
they have multiple points of more localized entry to rally for 
the waiver they seek. 
This expanded potential for federal liability might raise 
concerns for those focused on limiting government 
expenditures.  Let Congress keep control over the waiver 
power, they say, lest the will of the few overwhelm the 
resources of the many.  But those concerned that Congress is 
uniquely suited to make decisions regarding competing 
political interests cannot deny that Congress shares that 
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institutional competency, at least in part, with the agencies to 
whom it currently delegates a lot of policymaking.  In 
countless ways, it already recognizes that policymaking is a 
domain it can share with another branch.  Further, to those 
who would entrust waiver decisions exclusively to 
congressional expertise, I say that sovereign immunity waiver 
is not purely a policy issue.  It is fundamentally rooted in 
notions of supreme control, nationhood, and governmental 
soundness.  While federal immunity waiver has policy 
implications, it also has deep legitimacy consequences.255
Yes, keeping the federal government in line with its 
charging orders is a task Congress should, as a policy matter, 
share with its fellow branches.  But policy considerations 
aside, the Constitution makes clear: sovereign immunity and 
sovereign immunity waiver are concerns Congress already 
shares with the executive and the judiciary—the other 
branches the true sovereign chose to wield its proxy federal 
sovereignty.  Federal agencies and courts need now only wake 
up, act, and, as necessary, save the people from the unitary 
tyranny of a sovereign Congress. 
  The 
federal government’s ability to take any action—to exist, 
even—is a luxury provided it by the founding people.  And 
whether it uses that derivative authority to serve the people 
in ways that are not just prudent, but are constitutional and 
proper, will render the federal government faithful to its 
sovereign or will show it to be a bad proxy. 
 
 255. Odette Lienau describes the “school of popular sovereignty” as 
acknowledging that “the ultimate power and autonomy associated with 
sovereignty does not lie in the mere fact of governmental control” but “with a 
‘sovereign people,’ whose consent provides legitimacy to the government and 
authority for its decision.”  Lienau, supra note 132, at 76–77. 
